UIC John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy
Law
Volume 27
Issue 1 Journal of Computer & Information Law
- Fall 2009

Article 1

Fall 2009

Antitrust Law - A Stranger in the Wikinomics World? Regulating
Anti-Competitive Use of the DRM/DMCA Regime, 27 J. Marshall J.
Computer & Info. L. 1 (2009)
Rachel Aridor-Hershkovitz

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/jitpl
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Computer Law Commons, Intellectual Property
Law Commons, Internet Law Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Rachel Aridor-Hershkovitz, Antitrust Law - A Stranger in the Wikinomics World? Regulating AntiCompetitive Use of the DRM/DMCA Regime, 27 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 1 (2009)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/jitpl/vol27/iss1/1
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in UIC John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law by an authorized administrator
of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

\\server05\productn\S\SFT\27-1\SFT101.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

24-MAY-10

15:36

ARTICLES
ANTITRUST LAW – A STRANGER IN
THE WIKINOMICS WORLD?
REGULATING ANTI-COMPETITIVE
USE OF THE DRM/DMCA REGIME
RACHEL ARIDOR-HERSHKOVITZ*

ABSTRACT
Unlike traditional markets, Information Technology (“IT”) markets are
characterized by special and unique features that shall be discussed in
this article. Competition in IT markets is dynamic; nonmarket based
information production models (“peer production”) play a significant
role in IT markets; and IT markets are usually data markets rather
than product markets. The combination of the legal rule prohibiting
circumvention of technological measure under the DMCA and the use of
DRMs, created a new regime, the DRM/DMCA regime, which bestows
the entertainment industry with a new and strong right to control the
access to and use of the copyrighted work. The use of such a strong
right under the DRM/DMCA regime may have, in some instances, anticompetitive effects in IT markets. A recent example for such allegedly
anticompetitive use of the DRM/DMCA regime can be found in the litigations initiated by movie studios and the DVD CCA against two IT
companies, Kaleidescape and RealNetworks. These cases demonstrate
the attempts of the entertainment industry to block the marketing of
technological devices or software products that allow their end users to
upload the content of their DVD to the device’s hardware and replay it
afterwards from the device itself or their own PC. The key question
addressed in this article is the limits of the conceptual framework of
antitrust law and of copyright law for regulating possible anticompetitive effects of the DRM/DMCA regime on competition in IT markets in
the U.S., given the unique features of IT markets.
* Ph.D candidate, Faculty of Law, Haifa University, Israel. LL.M., 2005, New York
University; LL.B, 2003, Haifa University. I wish to thank Niva Elkin-Koren, the participants at the 2nd Law, Economics & Psychology Seminar, 4th EIPIN Doctoral Meeting,
Zurich (2008) and the participants of the Israeli Yearly Intellectual Property Research
Workshop, Jerusalem University (2009) for their helpful comments to earlier drafts of this
paper.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A market for different technologies for retrieving, transferring, storing,
and generally using information, i.e., Information Technology (“IT”)
forces the legal community and policy makers to face new and fascinating puzzles.1 One of the famous puzzles concerns the appropriate protection and distribution model for music.2 In this article, I will focus simply
on one narrow and specific puzzle likely to emerge from IT markets in
the United States: the implications of the combination of technologies
known as Technology Protection Measures (“TPMs”) and Digital Right
Management (“DRM”) measures with the U.S. anti-circumvention legal
regime governed by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).3
TPMs and DRMs are technological measures aimed at providing an
additional technological layer for protecting copyrighted works, above
the legal layer that copyright law grants.4 Generally speaking, the additional protection comes into effect by technologically controlling the access to and the use of the copyrighted works.5
However, TPMs and DRMs became very vulnerable as a consequence of the technology race, a common phenomenon in IT markets.6 In
many cases, the technologically savvy can easily evade TPMs and
DRMs7 and release the circumvention tool that he or she programmed to
the general public.8 The entertainment industry therefore demanded an
additional layer of legal protection above the TPMs and DRMs.9 Eventually, as a response to this demand, the United States Congress enacted
the DMCA in 1998, which contains anti-circumvention provisions.10
1. See WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUENTERTAINMENT (2004).
2. See Id.
3. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C §§ 1201-1205 (1998).
4. Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U. L. REV.
13, 32 (2006); Kirsten Osenga, Information May Want to be Free, But Information Products
Do Not: Protecting and Facilitating Transactions in Information Products, 30 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2099, 2120 (2009); Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Room for Consumers Under the DMCA,
22 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1119, 1127 (2007).
5. See Ian R. Kerr et al., Technological Protection Measures: Tilting at Copyrights
Windmill, 34 OTTAWA L. REV. 6 (2002).
6. See NIVA ELKIN-KOREN & ELI M. SALZBERGER, LAW, ECONOMICS AND CYBERSPACE:
THE EFFECTS OF CYBERSPACE ON ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 58-60 (2004).
7. Neil Conley, The Future of Licensing Music Online: The Roll of Collective Rights
Organizations and the Effect of Territoriality, 25 J. MARSHALL COMPUTER & INFO. L. 409,
461 (2008).
8. Yu, supra note 4, at 14; Dan L. Burk, DNA Rules: Legal and Conceptual Implications of Biological “Lock-Out” Systems, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1553, 1571 (2004) [hereinafter DNA
Rules].
9. Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1097 (2003) [hereinafter Anticircumvention Misuse].
10. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C §§ 1201-1205 (1998).
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In general, the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions prohibit circumventing TPMs or DRMs, which effectively controls access to copyrighted material.11 In addition, the DMCA prohibits the manufacturing
and marketing of technologies or devices that are primarily designed or
produced for the purpose of circumvention.12
The combination of the legal rule under the DMCA and the technological tool, the TPM or the DRM, created a new regime known as the
DRM/DMCA regime.13 The DRM/DMCA regime bestowed the entertainment industry with a new and strong right, the “paracopyright,”14 to control the access to copyrighted work. The fact that copyright owners may
assert very strong rights under the DRM/DMCA may have anticompetitive effects in IT markets in some instances.15
When analyzing possible anticompetitive effects, one must take into
consideration the main differences between the IT market and the traditional market. Discussed further in Section III, IT markets are characterized by dynamic competition16 and nonmarket based information
production models.17
In light of these unique features of IT markets, anticompetitive behavior can be defined as any behavior aimed at controlling and reducing
11. Id. at § 1201(a)(1).
12. Id. at § 1201(a)(2).
13. See Michael Geist, Anti-Circumvention Legislation and Competition Policy: Defining a Canadian Way?, in IN PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW
211-50 (Michael Giest ed., 2005); Peter Jaszi, Professor of Law, Washington College of Law,
Assoc. of Research Libraries Membership Meeting Proceedings, Intellectual Property Legislative Update: Copyright, Paracopyright, and Pseudo-Copyright, (May 1998), http://www.
arl.org/resources/pubs/mmproceedings/132mmjaszi.shtml.
14. See Geist, supra note 13, at 211-50; Jaszi, supra note 13.
15. See Posting of Ed Felten, DRM is Retreat, ED FELTEN’S BLOG (Jan. 22, 2009), http://
freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/drm-retreat (last visited Feb. 24, 2010) (stating in the
past year the practice of employing DRM on digital music has been declining); see Press
Release, Apple, Changes Coming to the iTunes Store (Jan. 6, 2009) available at http://www.
apple.com/pr/library/2009/01/06itunes.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2010) [hereinafter Apple
Press Release] (announcing that Apple is going to offer DRM-free content via its iTunes
store); Federal Trade Commission, FTC Town Hall: Digital Rights Management Technologies, Public Comments (Mar. 25, 2009) available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/DRM/
DRMCOMMENTS_final.pdf (expressing statement of Corynne McSherry, Electronic Frontier Foundation, that DRMs are still used as a tool for oppression of legitimate
competition).
16. Christopher Pleatsikas & David Teece, New Indicia Antitrust Analysis in Markets
Experiencing Rapid Innovation, in DYNAMIC COMPETITION AND PUBLIC POLICY (Jerry Ellig
ed., 2001); David Evans, Antitrust and the New Economy, in MICROSOFT, ANTITRUST AND
THE NEW ECONOMY: SELECTED ESSAYS 253 (David S. Evans Ed., 2002).
17. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 126-127 (2006). See also Section III.
B, supra (discussing nonmarket information production models and their effect on
competition).
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the development of innovative technologies and products.18 There are
several examples in IT markets in the United States for the use of the
DRM/DMCA regime in a way which might be considered anticompetitive
under this definition.19
For example, Lexmark, a well-known printer manufacturer, employed DRM to enforce its contractual requirement that prebate toner
cartridges be refilled only with Lexmark ink.20 When Static Control
Components (“SCC”) broke Lexmark’s aforementioned DRM and allowed
Lexmark printers to operate even if Lexmark did not refill the toner cartridge, Lexmark filed a lawsuit against SCC, claiming, among other
counts, that SCC violated the DMCA.21 Through that lawsuit, Lexmark
unsuccessfully attempted to use the DRM/DMCA regime in order to prevent third parties from developing refilled toner cartridges.22
Another case example of an unsuccessful attempt to stifle competition in IT markets through the use of the DRM/DMCA regime is Chamberlain v. Skylink.23
Chamberlain, a firm that developed and
manufactured garage door opener systems, sued Skylink, a firm that developed and manufactured a universal garage door opener that allowed
its users to open Chamberlain’s garage doors.24 Chamberlin contended
that Skylink had broken its DRM measure that was embedded into its
garage door opener systems and hence violated the DMCA.25
A more recent example for seemingly anticompetitive behavior
under the DRM/DMCA regime is the movie studios’ use of the Content
Scrambling System (“CSS”).26 The CSS is a DRM employed on Digital
Versatile Disks (“DVDs”) in order to protect the copyrighted content (i.e.,
the motion pictures) contained on the DVDs from unauthorized copying,
and also to enforce region-based viewing restrictions.27 The DVD Copy
18. MARCUS GLADER, INNOVATION MARKETS AND COMPETITION ANALYSIS: EU COMPETILAW AND US ANTITRUST LAW 28 (2006).
19. Id.
20. Robert J. Tomkowicz & Elizabeth F. Judge, The Right of Exclusive Access: Misusing Copyright to Expand the Patent Monopoly, 19 INTELL. PROP. J. 351, 373-74 (2006).
21. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir.
2004).
22. Id.; See Ali Martin, Digital Rights Management (DRM) in Online Music Stores:
DRM-Encumbered Music Downloads’ Inevitable Demise as a Result of the Negative Effect of
Heavy-Handed Copyright Law, 28 LOY. L. A. ENT. L. REV. 265, 280 (2007-8).
23. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See J.D. LASICA, DARKNET: HOLLYWOOD’S WAR AGAINST THE DIGITAL GENERATION
136-37 (2005).
27. On October 1999, the CSS was circumvented by Jon Lech Johansen (known also as
DVD John), then a fifteen-year-old Norwegian programmer, who posted the decryption
method, known as the DeCSS, on the internet. Id. The decryption and dissemination of
TION

\\server05\productn\S\SFT\27-1\SFT101.txt

2009]

unknown

Seq: 5

A STRANGER IN THE WIKINOMICS WORLD

24-MAY-10

15:36

5

Control Association (“CCA”) manages the use of CSS,28 and its members
are companies from the entertainment industry, such as Warner Bros.
and Walt Disney, as well as representative of well-known and powerful
firms from the hi-tech industry, such as Hewlett-Packard and Toshiba.29
Described further in Section IV, two IT companies, Kaleidescape and
RealNetworks, recently faced legal battles30 aimed at preventing them
from marketing their innovative technologies, the Kaleidescape System
and the RealDVD software and hardware products.31 The Kaleidescape
System and the RealDVD software and hardware products32 stored a
copy of a protected DVD on a hard disk drive of the Kaleidescape System
or the RealNetworks Facet product on the users’ own computer hard
drive and this allowed users to store a vast amount of video files. In the
case of RealNetwork’s Vegas software, users could upload and play back
the stored files of every DVD, in any room within the users’ home or
wherever the users’ PC is located.33 Both companies obtained a license
to use the CSS from the DVD CCA.34
Notwithstanding the two companies’ assertions of full compliance
with the CSS License, the movie studios and DVD CCA filed lawsuits
against Kaleidescape and RealNetworks for breaching the CSS License
and violating the DMCA.35 According to the movie studios and DVD
CCA, the purpose of both the Kaleidescape System and the RealDVD
DeCSS led to several lawsuits around the globe mainly aimed at blocking the widespread
distribution of the CSS circumvention tool. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corely, 273
F.3d 429 (2nd Cir. 2001); John Leyden, DVD John Is Free – Official, THE REGISTER, Jan. 7,
2003, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/01/07/dvd_jon_is_free_official/.
28. See DVD Copy Control Association, Content Scrambling System, http://www.
dvdcca.org/css/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
29. Among the DVD CCA members are Chris Cookson of Warner Bros., Ben Carr of
Walt Disney Studios, Jeffrey Lawrence of Intel, Gabe Beged-Dov of Hewlett-Packard,
David Harshman of Toshiba, and Andy Parsons of Pioneer Electronics. See March
Hachman, Proposed Amendment would Ban All DVD Copying, PC MAGAZINE (June 20,
2007), available at http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,1759,2148802,00.asp.
30. RealNetworks Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass’n Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 913 (N.D. Cal.
2009); DVD Copy Control Ass’n Inc. v. Kaleidescape Inc., 176 Cal. App. 4th 697 (6th Dist.
2009).
31. RealNetworks, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 913; Kaleidescape, 176 Cal. App. 4th at 697.
32. The legal procedure in RealNetworks v. DVD Copy Control concerned software and
hardware products developed by RealNetworks. RealNetworks, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913. The
software product, called Vegas, was developed and marketed by RealNetworks until the
court had issued a temporary restraint order on October 3, 2008. Id. at 917, 924. The
hardware product, called Facet, was under development during the legal procedures and
its main technological features were based on the Vegas software product. Id. at 925. The
court, therefore, focused its analysis on the legality of the Vegas software product, referring
to the software and hardware products as one - the RealDVD software. Id. at 924-27.
33. RealNetworks, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
34. Id. at 922; Kaleidescape, 176 Cal. App. 4th at 705.
35. RealNetworks, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 917; Kaleidescape, 176 Cal. App. 4th at 702.
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software is to allow users to illegally copy DVDs, a purpose which directly contradicts the express purpose of the CSS License, i.e. to prevent
the wholesale copying of protected DVDs.36
Explained further in Section IV, through lawsuits, like those discussed, movie studios and the members of the DVD CCA may gain broad
control over types of technologies and technological devices that other
companies develop.37 Furthermore, they can strictly limit the development of innovative technologies.38 The potential damage to efficient
competition in IT markets is quite apparent.
The purpose of this article is to discuss and examine, from a critical
point of view, the limits of the conceptual framework of antitrust law and
copyright law for regulating possible anticompetitive effects of the DRM/
DMCA regime on competition in IT markets in the United States. Because the United States’ innovation-based competitiveness has declined
in recent years,39 discussing and analyzing these questions and aiming
to define the most adequate law for securing efficient competition in current IT markets becomes even more relevant and important. Furthermore, these key questions, regarding the limits of the conceptual
framework of antitrust law and copyright law for regulating possible anticompetitive effects of the DRM/DMCA regime on competition in IT
markets in the U.S., are a part of a far broader and comprehensive debate regarding the limits of antitrust law for regulating behaviors in
New Economy industries,40 the intersection between antitrust law and
intellectual property law in the information age, and the adequate balance between these two bodies of law.
The intersection between antitrust law and intellectual property law
has been a source of perpetual confusion and controversy for a long time.
The debate about the appropriate balance between antitrust law and intellectual property law in the information age, or the debate about the
36. John Borland, Hollywood Allies Sue DVD Jukebox Maker, CNET NEWS, Dec. 7,
2004, http://www.news.com/Hollywood-allies-sue-DVD-jukebox-maker/2100-1025_35482206.html; Complaint, 2008 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings 888927, Universal City Studios
Production L.L.P., et al. v. RealNetworks, Inc., et al., No. 3:08CV4719 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30,
2008).
37. See RealNetworks, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913; Kaleidescape, 176 Cal. App. 4th at 702.
38. See RealNetworks, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913; Kaleidescape, 176 Cal. App. 4th at 702.
39. See Robert D. Atkinson & Scott M. Andes, The Atlantic Century: Benchmarking EU
and U.S. Innovation and Competitiveness, THE INFO., TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. (Feb.
25, 2009), http://www.itif.org/index.php?id=226; Steve Lohr, In Innovation, U.S. Said to Be
Losing Competitive Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009, at B9.
40. New Economy industries, such as the software industry, differ from old economy
industries in a number of ways. New economy industries demonstrate strong network effects, have high fixed costs and low marginal production costs, are more labor-intensive
and less capital intensive and the competition in such industries is dynamic. See Evans,
supra note 16, at 255-58.
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limits of antitrust law for regulating all sorts of behaviors in New Economy industries and securing efficient competition is, however, far beyond
the scope of this article. This article will focus only on a narrower,
though not less complex, aspect of the debate: possible antitrust and copyright law regulation of the DRM/DMCA regime’s anticompetitive effects
on competition in U.S. IT markets.
In order to do so, I will start by introducing and describing the DRM/
DMCA regime. Sections III and IV will describe the unique features of
IT markets, the essence of competition in IT markets, and possible anticompetitive effects as a result of the use of the DRM/DMCA regime.
Section V will examine, based on the conceptual framework and theoretical reasoning of antitrust law, whether antitrust law can provide an adequate framework for regulating anticompetitive behaviors in IT markets,
performed under the jacket of the DRM/DMCA regime.
Section VI will examine whether copyright law in the United States
can provide a more adequate framework for regulating anticompetitive
behaviors performed under the DRM/DMCA regime in IT markets while
securing the ultimate goal of further innovation, based on the way that
the United States courts in Lexmark and Chamberlain interpreted and
applied the conceptual framework of copyright law. Finally, Section VI
will conclude the article with a statement regarding future research
seeking the appropriate legal conceptual framework for analyzing the
anticompetitive behaviors performed under the DRM/DMCA regime.
II. THE DRM/DMCA REGIME: WHERE DID IT
ORIGINATE AND WHY?
A. DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: AN ADDITIONAL LOCK
CLOSED DOOR?

TO A

Digital technology has provided users from all over the world with
the ability to easily and quickly copy and disseminate high quality duplicates of any content at a marginal cost. The advent of the Internet, peerto-peer (“P2P”) file sharing computer programs and advanced personal
computers have resulted in what the entertainment industry perceived
as “rampant piracy” and forced the entertainment industry to face a new
and difficult challenge.41 Aiming to secure its existing copyrights in any
copyrighted work in spite of the copyright infringement possibilities that
new digital technologies facilitated, the entertainment industry started
to release its copyrighted works with Technological Protection Measures
(“TPMs”) (and later Digital Right Managements (“DRMs”) protection).42
41. FISHER, supra note 1, at 11-37.
42. Kerr et al., supra note 5, at 25-29.
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TPMs are a technological method that control the access to or the
use of a copyrighted work, and hence facilitate authorized use of copyrighted material. Scholars identified two categories of TPMs; both of
them usually exist within the same TPM.43 The first category is access
control measures, such as passwords and cryptography.44 Under this
category is encrypted content; for example, a data encryption and authentication method, such as the CSS, which is aimed at protecting the
content of DVDs from unauthorized copying and enforcing region-based
viewing restrictions.45
The second category of TPMs is use control measures that provide
the entertainment industry with the ability to control the underlying use
of a copyrighted work.46 For example, the Serial Copy Management System (“SCMS”) uses a watermark to prevent illegal production of multiple
generations of digital copies of a copyrighted work.47
DRMs are more complex and sophisticated systems for protecting
intellectual property rights.48 Unlike TPMs, DRMs are digital information systems for rights management that are bound into the lifecycle of
the copyrighted work, in any format.49 DRMs usually include a set of
technological tools for protecting the content as well as monitoring the
consumer’s behavior and controlling payment terms.50
There are two general categories of DRMs.51 The first category is
DRMs that do not utilize TPMs.52 An example of this type of DRM is the
technology that the Copyright Clearance Center in the United States
uses for handling and mediating clearance of rights, establishing license
terms, and paying certain fees in consideration for the use of a copyrighted work.53
The second category of DRMs is DRMs that do utilize TPMs.54 Apple’s DRM, FairPlay, is an example of a DRM in this category.55 Fair43. Id. at 20-23.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Kerr et al., supra note 5, at 20-23.
48. Id. at 25-29.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 25-26.
53. Kerr et al., supra note 5, at 26.
54. Id. at 25-29.
55. See Apple, Technologies – AAC Audio, http://www.apple.com/quicktime/technologies/aac/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2010) [hereinafter AAC Audio].
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Play encrypts Advanced Audio Coding (“AAC”),56 controls the access to
copyrighted works, and imposes certain licensing schemes through several restrictions on the use of the AAC encrypted files.57
The technology of TPMs and DRMs is frequently challenged. The
circumvention of CSS is only one example of such a challenge.58 The
outcome of these challenges was the evolution of a technology “arms
race,” a common phenomenon in IT markets.59 A technology arms race
induces technological development and innovations. This is because it
urges technology companies as well as individuals to try to enter the race
by introducing the new “killer” application, hot gadget, or state of the art
technology.60
56. AAC is an international standard for compression of digital audio files, developed
through the cooperation of several technology companies, such as AT&T and Sony. See
AAC Audio, supra note 55.
57. Among these use restrictions are the restriction on the number of devices a file can
be played on, the portable media player on which a file could be played on and the number
of times an individual user can burn a set of files collectively, known as a “playlist.” In
order to enforce these restrictions, FairPlay also collects data regarding the usage of each
content file. As of January 2009, Apple offers for sale via its iTunes store songs free of
DRM protection. Apple’s DRM, Fairplay, is still employed on movies and television shows.
See Apple Press Release, supra note 15.
58. On October 1999, CSS was circumvented by Jon Lech Johansen (“DVD John”),
then a fifteen-year-old Norwegian programmer, who posted the decryption method, known
as the DeCSS, on the Internet. See J.D. LASICA, DARKNET: HOLLYWOOD’S WAR AGAINST THE
DIGITAL GENERATION 136-37 (2005). The decryption and dissemination of DeCSS led to
several lawsuits around the globe aimed mainly at blocking the widespread distribution of
the CSS circumvention tool. See Universal City Studios v. Corely, 273 F.3d 429 (2nd Cir.
2001); John Leyden, DVD John Is Free – Official, THE REGISTER, Jan. 7, 2003, http://www.
theregister.co.uk/2003/01/07/dvd_jon_is_free_official/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
59. See ELKIN-KOREN & SALZBERGER, supra note 6, at 58-60.
60. Alongside the increased variety of new and innovative technologies, the technology
arms race also leads to a phenomenon known as rent seeking. Rent seeking is an economic
term used to describe the quest after what is called “rent” – the pure profit, i.e., the return
over and above the cost of generating such return. The costs of rent seeking associated
with intellectual property are fairly high comparing with those associated with property
rights. Intellectual property is waiting to be invented, created, or discovered, and once it is
invented, created, or discovered, the owner of such intellectual property receives a monopoly right. Thus, the rent seeking is reflected by the cost invested in the production of
knowledge, in order to be the first to win the big prize of a monopoly right. The investment
in the production of knowledge is in excess over the optimal level of necessary investment.
This leads to costs, or some say the waste, to the society, from an efficiency perspective.
See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 17-24 (2003). An example of such waste is found in the “race to the
bottom” of the two chipmaker giants, Intel and Advanced Micro Devices (“AMD”). Intel cut
prices in May 2006 on its dual-core Pentium D chips by up to fifty percent (50%) and on its
lower-end Celeron D chips by up to forty-three percent (43%). AMD was forced to respond
and cut prices in June that year on its low-end desktop chips by thirty percent (30%). See
Chris Kraeuter, AMD, Intel Race to the Bottom, FORBES, June 28, 2006, http://www.forbes.
com/2006/06/28/pricing-earnings-intel-cx_ck_0628intel.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
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With respect to DRMs, the battleground for the arms race, in the
eyes of the entertainment industry was the vulnerability of DRMs. TPMs
and DRMs did not provide a foolproof solution for the entertainment industry. The ease of circumventing DRMs by the technologically savvy
and the widespread distribution of such circumvention tools, combined
with the inability to locate, sue, and punish each and every unauthorized
end user, led to an increased demand by the entertainment industry for
additional legal protection.61
This time, however, the requested legal protection was not for the
copyrighted works themselves, but for the implemented DRMs used to
protect intellectual property rights in those works. This ought to be kept
in mind when examining the copyright law’s possible handling of the implications, both legal and technological, of the DRM/DMCA regime.
B. LEGISLATORS TO THE RESCUE: THE DMCA ANTICIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS
1. A Glance at Legislative History
i.

WIPO Treaties

The pressure of the entertainment industry over the years has led to
discussions held by the U.S. government. These discussions were aimed
at seeking the appropriate legislative policy that adequately balances
the conflicting interests of the entertainment industry and the public at
large, while at the same time encourage the continuing growth and prosperity of the U.S. economy in the information age.62
The conclusions of those government researchers were presented in
1995, as the Information Infrastructure Task Force White Paper (“White
Paper”).63 The White Paper included recommendations for the enactment of specific anti-circumvention legislation, referring only to antitrafficking activities. The White Paper was proposed to the U.S. Congress in 1995. At the same time, the Clinton Administration promoted
the White Paper internationally, offering it to World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) members as a basis for future treaties.
In December 1996, a diplomatic conference was held in Geneva.
This conference was dedicated to discussing the adequate ways to bring
the international copyright system up to date with the developments of
61. Anticircumvention Misuse, supra note 9, at 1097.
62. See Donna L. Lee, Reverse Engineering of Computer Programs under the DMCA:
Recognizing a “Fair Access” Defense, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 537, 549-50 (2006).
63. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995).
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digital technology.64 At the end of this diplomatic conference, two treaties were adopted: the WIPO Copyright Treaty (“WCT”) and the WIPO
Performance and Phonograms Treaty (“WPPT”) (together: the “WIPO
Treaties”);65 both of which were said to have been drawn in part from the
White Paper.66
Articles 11 and 12 of the WCT67 and Articles 18 and 19 of the
WPPT68 established, within ratifying states’ national law, anti-circum64. Richard Li-Dar Wang, DMCA Anti-Circumvention Provisions in a Different Light:
Perspectives from Transnational Observation of Five Jurisdictions, 34 AM. INTELL. PROP. L.
ASS’N 219 (2006).
65. World Intellectual Property Organization, Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36
I.L.M. 65, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html [hereinafter WCT]; World Intellectual Property Organization, Performance and Phonograms
Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/
trtdocs_wo034.html [hereinafter WPPT].
66. Lee, supra note 62, at 550-51.
67. Article 11 of the WCT states:
Obligations concerning Technological Measures:
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal
remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are
used by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty or
the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of their works, which are
not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law.
Article 12 of the WCT states:
Obligations concerning Rights Management Information:
(1) Contracting Parties shall provide adequate and effective legal remedies against
any person knowingly performing any of the following acts knowing, or with respect to civil remedies having reasonable grounds to know, that it will induce,
enable, facilitate or conceal an infringement of any right covered by this Treaty or
the Berne Convention:
(i) to remove or alter any electronic rights management information without
authority;
(ii) to distribute, import for distribution, broadcast or communicate to the public,
without authority, works or copies of works knowing that electronic rights management information has been removed or altered without authority.
(2) As used in this Article, “rights management information” means information
which identifies the work, the author of the work, the owner of any right in the
work, or information about the terms and conditions of use of the work, and any
numbers or codes that represent such information, when any of these items of
information is attached to a copy of a work or appears in connection with the communication of a work to the public.
68. Article 18 of the WPPT states:
Obligations concerning Technological Measures:
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal
remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are
used by performers or producers of phonograms in connection with the exercise of
their rights under this Treaty and that restrict acts, in respect of their performances or phonograms, which are not authorized by the performers or the producers
of phonograms concerned or permitted by law.
Article 19 of the WPPT states:
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vention provisions aimed to provide:
adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by authors
in connection with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty or the
Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of their works,
which are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by
law.69

The scope of the anti-circumvention provisions in any national law depends, however, on the interpretation of several words in the WIPO
Treaties’ language.70 Such interpretation includes, the terms “adequate”
and “effective” with respect to the legal protection that each state should
provide to DRMs.71 I will now turn to examine how the United States
integrated Articles 11 and 12 of the WCT and Articles 18 and 19 of the
WPPT into the DMCA.
ii. The DMCA
The Clinton Administration and the entertainment industry perceived the adoption of the WIPO Treaties and the obligation of the signatory states to ratify it into their national legislation as an opportunity to
revive the attempts to enact the DMCA. Thus, in 1998, Congress enObligations concerning Rights Management Information
(1) Contracting Parties shall provide adequate and effective legal remedies against
any person knowingly performing any of the following acts knowing, or with respect to civil remedies having reasonable grounds to know, that it will induce,
enable, facilitate or conceal an infringement of any right covered by this Treaty:
(i) to remove or alter any electronic rights management information without
authority;
(ii) to distribute, import for distribution, broadcast, communicate or make available to the public, without authority, performances, copies of fixed performances or
phonograms knowing that electronic rights management information has been removed or altered without authority.
(2) As used in this Article, “rights management information” means information
which identifies the performer, the performance of the performer, the producer of
the phonogram, the phonogram, the owner of any right in the performance or phonogram, or information about the terms and conditions of use of the performance
or phonogram, and any numbers or codes that represent such information, when
any of these items of information is attached to a copy of a fixed performance or a
phonogram or appears in connection with the communication or making available
of a fixed performance or a phonogram to the public.
69. See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the
Anti-Circumvention Regulation Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 529
(1999). It is important to note that although the WIPO Treaties mentioned only TPMs,
scholars agreed that it should be treated as referring to DRMs as well.
70. See Geist, supra note 13, at 223-24.
71. Professor Michael Geist contended that the use of such terms implies that national
legislation should set some measure of legal protection that would be considered as effective by a reasonable person. See Id. at 223.

\\server05\productn\S\SFT\27-1\SFT101.txt

2009]

unknown

Seq: 13

24-MAY-10

A STRANGER IN THE WIKINOMICS WORLD

15:36

13

acted the DMCA.72 The final version of the DMCA was said to be Congress’ attempt to satisfy almost all of the parties involved in one piece of
legislation,73 while implementing the norms set forth in the WIPO
Treaties.
2. The DMCA Anti-Circumvention Provisions
Section 1201 of the DMCA is considered to be the most intensive
regulation of circumvention activities.74 The section covers any DRM
that “effectively controls”75 the access to or the use of copyrighted work
and prohibits both the act of circumvention of such DRMs as well as the
manufacturing and marketing of technology or devices primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumvention. Section
1201(a)(1)(A) of the DMCA76 refers to the act of circumvention itself and
prohibits the circumvention of technological measures that effectively
control access to copyrighted work.
Sections 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b) of the DMCA are both known as the
anti-trafficking provisions because although they both are related to
technological devices and services, the sections differ in focus.77 While
Section 1201(a)(2)78 focuses on the right to control the access to a copyrighted work, Section 1201(b)79 protects the familiar set of exclusive
72. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (1998).
73. FISHER, supra note 1, at 93.
74. Wang, supra note 64, at 223-24; 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1998).
75. 17 U.S.C. §1201(b)(2)(B) defines “effectively controls” as “(B) a technological measure [that] ‘effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title’ if the measure,
in the ordinary course of its operation, prevents, restricts, or otherwise limits the exercise
of a right of a copyright owner under this title.”
76. Id. at § 1201(a)(1)(A) (stating: “[n]o person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title”).
77. Id. at § 1201(a)(2)&(b).
78. Id. at § 1201(a)(2).
(2) No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof,
that—
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected
under this title; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with
that person’s knowledge for use in circumventing a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a work protected under this title. Id.
79. Id. at § 1201(b).
(b) Additional Violations.—
(1) No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof,
that—
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rights of the copyright owner, by prohibiting the production and distribution of technologies that are mainly designed to circumvent content and
use control measures.80
The goal of both anti-trafficking provisions is to prevent third parties from enabling end users to gain unauthorized access to copyrighted
works by providing “black box” devices or services designed to circumvent access control measures. Therefore, both anti-trafficking provisions
refer to a technological device that fulfills one of the following conditions:
(i) the device is primarily designed for the purpose of circumvention; (ii)
has only limited commercially significant purpose or use outside circumvention; or (iii) is marketed with the knowledge that it will be used for
purposes of circumvention.
The definition of prohibited technological devices in connection with
the anti-trafficking provisions leaves, however, wide leeway for interpretation. Technologies that are not “primarily designed” for circumvention, have commercially significant purposes other than circumvention
and are not knowingly marketed for the purpose of circumvention,
should be exempt from the scope of anti-trafficking prohibitions.81 However, if the provisions of the DMCA are interpreted too broadly, the risk
increases significantly that the DMCA might end up barring the manufacturing and dissemination of devices or services that have legitimate
uses other than to circumvent measures for controlling the access to
copyrighted works.82
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing protection
afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright
owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a
right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with
that person’s knowledge for use in circumventing protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this
title in a work or a portion thereof.
(2) As used in this subsection—
(A) to “circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure” means avoiding, bypassing, removing, deactivating, or otherwise impairing a technological
measure; and
(B) a technological measure “effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under
this title” if the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, prevents, restricts, or otherwise limits the exercise of a right of a copyright owner under this
title. Id.
80. FISHER, supra note 1, at 93.
81. Id.
82. For a counter argument, see, for example, Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation
for the “Digital Millennium,” 23 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 137, 145-47 (1999).

\\server05\productn\S\SFT\27-1\SFT101.txt

2009]
i.

unknown

Seq: 15

24-MAY-10

A STRANGER IN THE WIKINOMICS WORLD

15:36

15

Exemptions and Limitations

In order to correctly weigh the hazardous ramifications of the DRM/
DMCA regime, it is necessary to pay attention to the exemptions to and
limitations of the anti-circumvention provisions and to properly understand the exact scope of the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions. First,
the anti-circumvention provisions as a whole do not prevent the end user
from circumventing on her own, the technological measures aimed at effectively protecting the exclusive rights of the copyright owner. The anticircumvention provisions of Section 1201(b) only prohibit the trafficking
of such circumvention tools.83 However, there are only few technology
savvy people among the public that are capable of circumventing such
technological protection measures for their own fair use.84
With respect to the limitation of the anti-circumvention provisions,
the DMCA contains two preservation clauses. Section 1201(c)(1)85 declares that nothing in Section 1201 affects rights, remedies, or defenses,
including the fair use defense. Section 1201(c)(2)86 states that nothing
in Section 1201 diminishes or enlarges vicarious or contributory copyright infringement.
In addition, the prohibitions under Section 1201 are subject to several exemptions. Among these exemptions is, for example, the reverse
engineering exemption set forth in Section 1201(f).87 This exemption is
83. Id. at 139.
84. Samuelson, supra note 69, at 522-23.
85. Section 1201(c)(1) of the DMCA states “(c) Other Rights, Etc., Not Affected.—(1)
Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright
infringement, including fair use, under this title.”
86. Section 1201(c)(2) of the DMCA states “(2) Nothing in this section shall enlarge or
diminish vicarious or contributory liability for copyright infringement in connection with
any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof.”
87. Section 1201(f) of the DMCA states:
(f) Reverse Engineering.—
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)(1)(A), a person who has lawfully obtained the right to use a copy of a computer program may circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a particular portion of
that program for the sole purpose of identifying and analyzing those elements of
the program that are necessary to achieve interoperability of an independently
created computer program with other programs, and that have not previously
been readily available to the person engaging in the circumvention, to the extent
any such acts of identification and analysis do not constitute infringement under
this title.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a)(2) and (b), a person may develop and employ technological means to circumvent a technological measure, or
to circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure, in order to enable
the identification and analysis under paragraph (1), or for the purpose of enabling
interoperability of an independently created computer program with other programs, if such means are necessary to achieve such interoperability, to the extent
that doing so does not constitute infringement under this title.
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limited to the reverse engineering of a lawfully obtained copy of a computer program for the sole purpose of identifying and analyzing those
elements of the program that are necessary to achieve compatibility with
another computer program. This exemption was severely criticized,
since it is limited only to computer programs, for the purpose of compatibility and is restricted to circumstances in which the elements of the program were not previously readily available to the person engaging in the
de-compilation.88 Section 1201(j)89 of the DMCA permits circumvention
and development of technological tools for such circumvention, for the
purpose of security testing of computers, computer networks, or computer systems, in order to identify flaws and the vulnerability of such
systems and with the authorization of the owner or operator of such
systems.
(3) The information acquired through the acts permitted under paragraph (1), and
the means permitted under paragraph (2), may be made available to others if the
person referred to in paragraph (1) or (2), as the case may be, provides such information or means solely for the purpose of enabling interoperability of an independently created computer program with other programs, and to the extent that
doing so does not constitute infringement under this title or violate applicable law
other than this section.
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term “interoperability” means the ability of
computer programs to exchange information, and of such programs mutually to
use the information which has been exchanged.
88. Lee, supra note 62, at 549-50.
89. Section 1201(j) of the DMCA states:
(j) Security Testing.—
(1) Definition.— For purposes of this subsection, the term “security testing” means
accessing a computer, computer system, or computer network, solely for the purpose of good faith testing, investigating, or correcting, a security flaw or vulnerability, with the authorization of the owner or operator of such computer, computer
system, or computer network.
(2) Permissible acts of security testing.— Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)(1)(A), it is not a violation of that subsection for a person to engage in an
act of security testing, if such act does not constitute infringement under this title
or a violation of applicable law other than this section, including section 1030 of
title 18 and those provisions of title 18 amended by the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act of 1986.
(3) Factors in determining exemption.— In determining whether a person qualifies for the exemption under paragraph (2), the factors to be considered shall include—
(A) whether the information derived from the security testing was used solely to
promote the security of the owner or operator of such computer, computer system
or computer network, or shared directly with the developer of such computer, computer system, or computer network; and
(B) whether the information derived from the security testing was used or maintained in a manner that does not facilitate infringement under this title or a violation of applicable law other than this section, including a violation of privacy or
breach of security.
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In addition to the exemptions set forth in Section 1201 of the DMCA,
the Librarian of Congress, in consultation with the Register of Copyrights, is authorized to identify, every three years, particular classes of
works whose users would be “adversely affected by the prohibition. . . in
their ability to make non-infringing uses under this title of a particular
class of copyrighted works.”90 Unfortunately, there are no guidelines for
determining which classes should be exempt.
During the three-year period following the rulemaking procedure
that identifies the works, users of these works will not be subject to liability under Section 1201(a)(1) of the DMCA for circumventing measures
that control access to the specified classes of works.91 It should be emphasized that this rulemaking procedure only permits users to circumvent access control measures on their own. Therefore, as noted before, in
practice, only technology savvy users can benefit from the exempt
classes.
In November 2006, the Librarian of Congress announced six new
classes to be exempt from the anti-circumvention provisions of the
DMCA.92 One of those six classes of exemptions is computer programs
protected by dongles.93 In a case where an error in the dongle prevents
access to the computer program, the damaged dongle is no longer manufactured and no replacement is readily available on the market, the circumvention of the damaged dongle is allowed.94
The rationale behind this class of exempt works was that many
times damaged dongles prevented authorized users from accessing their
legally purchased computer program. But because in many cases the
software vendors were already out of business or unresponsive, the authorized users were left without the ability to access their legally purchased computer software.95
However, the Register refused, for technical reasons and without
discussing the subject matter itself, to broaden the exempt class of works
to include, “hardware or software incompatibilities or require obsolete
90. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(c).
91. Ginsburg, supra note 82, at 139.
92. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, RULEMAKING ON EXEMPTIONS FROM PROHIBITION ON
CIRCUMVENTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL MEASURES THAT CONTROL ACCESS TO COPYRIGHTED
WORKS (2006), available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/docs/1201_recommendation.pdf
[hereinafter RULEMAKING ON EXEMPTIONS]. The Librarian of Congress extended, on an interim basis, the 2006 existing exempted classes. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, EXEMPTIONS
TO PROHIBITION ON CIRCUMVENTION OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION SYSTEMS FOR ACCESS CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES (2009) available at http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2009/74fr55138.
pdf [hereinafter EXEMPTIONS TO PROHIBITION].
93. RULEMAKING ON EXEMPTIONS, supra note 92, at p. 33 § III(A)(3).
94. See Id.
95. See Id.
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operating systems or obsolete hardware as a condition of access.”96
Thus, a comprehensive analysis of the market power achieved through
the use of the DRM/DMCA regime for fostering incompatibility and by
doing so, raising the barrier to entry into the market, was not performed.
An additional class of works that was exempt in the 2006 rulemaking process was computer programs that enable wireless telephone
handsets to connect to a wireless telephone communication network,
when circumvention is accomplished for the sole purpose of lawfully connecting to a wireless telephone communications network.97 This exempt
class of works is referred to by providers of cell-phone telecommunication
networks as the practice of locking the cell phones’ operating system using software-based locks.98 The purpose of such locking was to prevent
customers from using their cell phones on a competitor’s network (even
after all contractual obligations to the original wireless carrier had been
satisfied).99 Under this practice, a customer who wished to change telecommunication network carriers had to purchase a new phone from a
competing mobile telecommunications carrier.100
While approving this exemption, the Register concluded that the
software locks providers of cell phone telecommunication networks used
are access controls that adversely affect the ability of consumers to make
non-infringing use of the software on their cellular phones.101 Furthermore, the Register determined that the software lock is not employed in
order to protect the interests of the copyright owner or the value or integrity of the copyrighted work; rather, the purpose of the software lock is
purely business – to limit the ability of customers to switch to a competitive carrier.102 By accepting this class of exempt work, the Register did
express competition related considerations and discussed inexplicitly
certain anticompetitive uses of the DRM/DMCA regime.103 According to
the Register:
The access controls do not appear to actually be deployed in order to
protect the interests of the copyright owner or the value or integrity of
the copyrighted work; rather, they are used by wireless carriers to limit
the ability of subscribers to switch to other carriers, a business decision
that has nothing whatsoever to do with the interests protected by
copyright.104
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See Id.
See Id. at p. 42 §III(A)(5) (2006).
See Id. p. 48.
See RULEMAKING ON EXEMPTIONS, supra note 92, at p. 48.
Id.
Id. at p. 50.
Id. at p. 50-51.
Id. at p. 52.
Id.
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Interestingly, the Register dismissed several requests for exempting
additional classes of work. Some of them referred to the use of the DRM/
DMCA regime in an anticompetitive manner without considering the potential damage to the competition in IT markets resulting from such anticompetitive use of the DRM/DMCA regime.105 Among these dismissed
classes was a request to exempt circumvention of technological measures
for space shifting. The purpose of this proposed exemption was to permit
circumventing DRMs employed on audiovisual and musical works. This
would allow copying these content works to other media or devices and to
access these works on those alternative media or devices.106 The proposed exemption did not identify specific technology to which such content would be copied.107
Discussing a similar technology as the Kaleidescape System and the
RealDVD software, which allowed its users to store a vast amount of
video files by making a secure private copy of every DVD that the consumer uploads and plays on a hard disk drive then played the stored files
in any room within the consumer’s house,108 the Register refused to accept this proposed exemption. The Register explained its refusal by stating that there is no legal precedent that declared space shifting as a noninfringing use. Hence, under the current copyright regime, the reproduction of a work onto a new device constitutes copyright infringement.109
Thus, so long as copying content onto an alternative device is considered
copyright infringement, there is no basis for recommending an exemption to the ban on circumvention.110 In its reasoning, the Register ignored the possibility of anticompetitive use of the DRM/DMCA regime in
circumstances similar to those of Kaleidescape and RealNetwork cases.
The Register also declined to allow circumvention of DRMs employed on DVDs in order to be played on Linux operating systems.111 By
rejecting this proposed exemption, the Register did not consider the importance of having a variety of novel technologies. Inversely, the Register believed that present alternatives such as the ability to play DVDs on
television sets at a respectively low cost and possibly having a dual-boot
system on a computer of a Linux user was sufficient enough.112
105. RULEMAKING ON EXEMPTIONS, supra note 92, at p. 69-78 § III(B)(2)-(6).
106. Id. at p. 69 § III(B)(2).
107. Id.
108. Kaleidescape did not circumvent the CSS, but rather kept it secured. See Julie
Jacobson, DVD CCA Aims to Prohibit DVD Ripping Once and for All, CEPRO, June 21,
2007, http://www.cepro.com/article/dvd_cca_aims_to_prohibit_dvd_ripping_once_and_for_
all/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
109. RULEMAKING ON EXEMPTIONS, supra note 92, at p. 70.
110. See Id.
111. Id. at p. 72-74.
112. Id. at p. 74.
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Therefore, reviewing the exemptions to and limitation of the DMCA
anti-circumvention provisions reveals a rather gloomy picture. As described above, the exemptions are pretty narrow. Moreover, in most
cases, only savvy users can benefit from the existence of the exemptions
and limitations.
3. The DRM/DMCA Regime - A Birth of a New Right?
Following the enactment of a broad ban on circumvention activity
escorted by limited exemptions as described above, the combination of
the legal rule under the DMCA and the technological tool, the DRM, created a new regime: the DRM/DMCA regime. By protecting the application of DRMs and prohibiting the circumvention of DRMs and the
trafficking of circumvention tools, the DRM/DMCA regime bestowed the
entertainment industry with a new and strong right, “paracopyright.”113
This right controls access to the copyrighted work. Such a right is distinguished from the familiar set of exclusive rights of the copyright owner,
such as reproduction, creation of derivative works, distribution, and public performance/display.114
Indeed, the practice of placing DRMs on digital music has been declining. For example, the major record labels have signed an agreement
with Apple for the removal of the DRM from songs sold via Apple’s online
music store, iTunes.115 The celebration, however, of the retreat of
DRMs116 based on such developments was premature. DRMs are still
used as a tool for oppression of legitimate competition.117
There are several instances in which right holders took advantage of
the DRM/DMCA regime. I will discuss the use of the DRM/DMCA regime and the effect of such use on competition in IT markets in Section
IV. Before delving into this subject, however, it is important to understand the unique features of the IT market as well as the competition in
such a market. Understanding the unique features and the competition
in such a market is crucial for analyzing the adequacy of the conceptual
framework of both antitrust law and copyright law to regulation of anticompetitive behaviors in IT markets in the United States.
III. IT MARKETS AND COMPETITION
As stated earlier,118 the main goal of this article is to examine the
113. See Anticircumvention Misuse, supra note 9, at 1096.
114. Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management
Systems, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 41, 48 (2001).
115. Apple Press Release, supra note 15.
116. Felten, supra note 15.
117. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 15.
118. See Section I, supra.
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limits of the conceptual framework of the antitrust law and copyright
law for regulating possible anticompetitive effects of the DRM/DMCA regime on competition in IT markets in the United States. As I shall further discuss in this Section and in Section IV, the unique features of IT
markets and the dynamic competition in such markets may require modifications of antitrust policy.119 Therefore, a comprehensive examination
of this research question requires a prior understanding of the unique
features of IT markets and the competition in such markets.
In order to obtain such an understanding, I will start this Section by
presenting the difference between competition in IT markets and traditional markets. I will then emphasize the additional feature of IT markets represented by the role that nonmarket production models play in
such markets. Afterwards, I will discuss the effect these features may
have on the analysis of the conceptual framework of both antitrust law
and copyright law for the regulation of anticompetitive behaviors in IT
markets in the United States.
A. IT MARKETS

AND

TRADITIONAL MARKETS

Generally speaking, markets in the New Economy, such as IT markets, differ from traditional markets in the type of competition. While
the competition in the traditional market is static, competition in IT
markets is dynamic.120
A market that is characterized by static competition is usually a homogenous, substitutable product market, which can be easily identified.121 A market characterized by dynamic competition, on the other
hand, is usually an innovation market with strong R&D efforts and a
data market, rather than a product market.122 Thus, not only is such a
market difficult to define,123 in addition, a data market may also present
new concerns relating to consumer protection. Frequently, harm to consumers might be considered to be a violation of antitrust law. For example, undermining compatibility between software products or delaying
the development of competing products can be considered examples of
119. See J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law, 5 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 581 (2009).
120. Evans, supra note 16, at 255-58.
121. See Sidak & Teece, supra note 119, at 602-03.
122. See Id. at 603-07. Pamela Jones Harbour & Tara Isa Koslov, Section 2 in a Web 2.0
World: An Expanded Vision of Relevant Product Markets, 76 ANTITRUST L. J. (forthcoming
2010) (on file with author).
123. J. Thomas Rosch, Antitrust Regulation of Innovation Market, Remarks at the ABA
Antitrust Intellectual Property Conference (Feb. 5, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
speeches/rosch/090205innovationspeech.pdf.
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indirect consumer harm that are also treated as antitrust violations.124
The ramifications such concerns may have on antitrust law are yet to be
examined, however.
Dynamic competition is also characterized by a strong network effect.125 Network effect is a familiar phenomenon both in dynamic and
static competition. A market demonstrates a network effect when, everything else being equal, the value for a buyer of an extra unit is higher
when more units are sold.126 In static competition, for example, the telephone network demonstrates a network effect. In dynamic competition,
however, the network effect is different from that in static competition in
the sense that in dynamic competition, the network is a collection of different but compatible goods that share a common technical platform
called a virtual network.127 For example, all computers running the
Microsoft Vista operating system share the same virtual network.128
Moreover, in static competition, the manufacturer of the controlling homogenous goods holds the dominant market power. Whereas in virtual
networks, the dominant market power is vested in the hands of the firm
that owns the common technical platform, i.e., the technical standard,
which allows all the different but compatible goods to connect to the
same virtual network.129
Another difference between dynamic competition and static competition concerns the fixed and marginal costs. The fixed cost of producing
goods – both in a static competition and in a dynamic competition –is
usually high.130 Firms must invest significant amounts of time, money,
and effort in research that is necessary for developing their product.
Hence, their fixed costs are rather high. The marginal cost, i.e., the cost
for developing an additional unit of the same product, is rather low in a
dynamic competition compared to static competition.131 In dynamic
competition, after the initial high investment, and once the development
124. Mark Cooper, Antitrust as Consumer Protection in the New Economy: Lessons from
the Microsoft Case, 52 HASTINGS L. J. REVIEW 813, 859-63 (2001).
125. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to High Technology
Competition, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 74-95 (2002); William Landes & Richard Posner,
Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 UNIV. OF CHIC. L. REV. 471 (2003).
126. See Piraino, supra note 125, at 74-95; Landes & Posner, supra note 125.
127. Seungwoo Son, Can Black Dot (Shrinkwrap) Licenses Override Federal Reverse Engineering Rights? The Relationship between Copyright, Contract and Antitrust Laws, 6 TUL.
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 63, 138 (2004).
128. Nicholas Economides, Competition Policy in Network Industry: An Introduction, in
THE NEW ECONOMY AND BEYOND: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 96 (Dennis W. Jansen ed.,
2006).
129. Wendy Milanese, The Tension Must Break: The Irreconcilable Interplay Between
Antitrust, Defenses to Infringement and Protection of Standardized Software Development
Tools, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 407, 415-17 (1999).
130. Evans, supra note 16.
131. Id.
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of the product is complete, the marginal cost is low. For example,
Microsoft devoted 10,000 employees over a five year period to develop its
Vista operating system.132 Assuming each employee earned about
$200,000 as a yearly average, it cost Microsoft billions of dollars to develop Vista.133 Once the development was completed, however, the cost
of creating an additional copy of the software was nearly zero. Contrastingly, in static competition, once the design of a chair is completed, the
marginal cost for producing an additional unit of the same chair could be
quite expensive, as each chair that is created requires the same investment in raw materials and human labor.
An additional feature of dynamic competition, which distinguishes it
from a static one, concerns the weight of raw material and human labor
in each type of competition. In dynamic competition markets, the goods
are the result of the creative skills of an individual, be it an individual
operating on his own in a nonmarket based platform, or an employee of a
commercial firm.134 Unlike in a static competition market, there is
hardly any need for manufacturing plants or equipment in order to develop a successful product.135 As the most important resource for the
development and creation of the goods in dynamic competition markets
is the human resource, firms in an IT market are less capital intensive
and more labor intensive.136
Furthermore, in static competition, the goods compete with each
other within the same single period.137 For example, in the telephone
market, the providers of telephone lines and services compete with each
other over who will provide consumers with attractive telephone services
at the lowest price during the same period. Dynamic competition, however, is not among the same goods at the same single period. Innovative
goods do not compete with each other within a single period, but rather
over time.138 Thus, competition between goods sold simultaneously is
irrelevant for assessing competition in a dynamic market. In dynamic
competition, the competition is not about who can sell a product or provide a service for the lowest price. Competition in a dynamic market is
about who will introduce the most innovative product or an improved
132. Dean Takahashi, Why Vista Might be the Last of its Kind?, THE SEATTLE TIMES,
Dec. 4, 2006, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2003
460386_btview04.html.
133. Id.
134. Evans, supra note 16, at 256-57.
135. Id.
136. Id. This feature of dynamic competition eventually leads to the reduction in the
firm’s importance and the increasingly significance of nonmarket peer production mechanisms. See BENKLER, supra note 17, at 126-27.
137. Ariel Katz, Making Sense of Nonsense: Intellectual Property, Antitrust and Market
Power, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 837, 874-75 (2007).
138. Id.
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product into the market.139 Therefore, in order to evaluate competition
in a dynamic market, one should examine the competition between different entities for the development of a new product that may replace the
existing one.140
B. DIFFERENT PRODUCTION MODELS
IT markets are not only characterized by dynamic competition, as
opposed to static competition in traditional markets, but also the role
that nonmarket based production models play in the production of information goods.141 This feature of IT markets is also relevant to the main
goal of this article – examining the limits of the conceptual framework of
the antitrust law and copyright law for regulating possible anticompetitive effects of the DRM/DMCA regime on competition in IT markets in
the United States. As I shall further discuss in Section III.B.2 infra, the
strengthening of nonmarket production models in IT markets may also
have significant implications on the adequacy of the conceptual framework of antitrust law and of copyright law for regulating possible anticompetitive effects in IT markets in the United States.
1. Nonmarket Based Information Production Models
In traditional markets, the production of information and knowledge
is governed by the industrial information economy.142 The production
and distribution of valuable and important information goods requires
physical capital.143 Making information goods widely accessible and distributing them to a wide audience involves a lot of physical and financial
capital.144 Raising the financial investment necessary for funding the
physical capital is only possible if market based production and organizational strategies are taken.145
Thanks to the development of the Internet, personal computers, and
network connections during the past decade and a half, the physical capital that was once necessary for the production of information goods is
now widely distributed throughout society.146 Personal computers,
which serve as the physical capital necessary for information production,
are rather cheap and widely distributed.147 Most of the raw material
necessary for information production, such as information, knowledge,
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id.; Sidak & Teece, supra note 119, at 599-00.
BENKLER, supra note 17, at 41-48.
Id. at 31-32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
BENKLER, supra note 17, at 6.
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and culture, are now available for use as a public good.148 Furthermore,
the technical architecture of the Internet provides a solution for most of
the problems associated with information production.149 Thus, the physical capital is no longer the economic core of information production.150
Moreover, these technological developments led to a significant reduction in the cost of producing and distributing information and knowledge, which eventually led to a reduction in the necessity of
commercially concentrated business models as the single economic structure for the production and communication of information and
knowledge.151
Thus, as Professor Benkler brilliantly explained, these technological
developments and changes have led to the emergence of network information production that uses the physical capital held by individuals in
society.152 Network information production is characterized by peer production (also known as “wikinomics”),153 i.e., cooperative and coordinated actions taken by decentralized individuals in a nonmarket
mechanism, free of proprietary strategies.154
There are several prominent examples of nonmarket peer production mechanisms of information goods.155 Free software, an approach to
software development initiated by Richard Stallman and based on peer
production, collaboration between developers, and a nonproprietary
model, is one of these examples.156
NASA provides another example of nonmarket peer production
mechanisms of information goods. NASA requested public help in suggesting creative ways to analyze and electronically catalog a collection of
notes by rocket scientist Wernher von Braun.157
Another example is Yelp, a review website that allows businesses to
post their advertisements and business profiles on it and then in turn
148. Id. at 105.
149. Id. at 105-06.
150. Id. at 52.
151. Id. at 63-68.
152. Id. at 6.
153. See Daryl Lim, Beyond Microsoft: Intellectual Property, Peer Production and the
Law’s Concern with Market Dominance, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L. J.
291, 300 (2008).
154. BENKLER, supra note 17, at 62-63.
155. See, e.g., Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.org/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2010); Yelp,
http://www.yelp.com/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2010 12:00 GMT).
156. BENKLER, supra note 17, at 50-56.
157. Betsy Mason, NASA Wants Your Ideas for Digitizing Rocket Scientist’s Notes,
WIRED SCIENCE, June 26, 2009, http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2009/06/nasadata-2. In
addition, NASA invited users to devote a few minutes of their time in order to “mark craters on maps of Mars, classify craters that have already been marked, or search the Mars
landscape for “honeycomb terrain.” The work done by the users, “the click-workers,” substituted an analysis by scientists or graduate students. BENKLER, supra note 17 at 69-70.
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enables individual users to post their review on any business in their
geographical location.158 This is an example of a powerful nonmarket
peer production model. Yelp is even said to have the power to make or
break restaurants and small businesses in the San Francisco Bay Area,
where the Yelp service started.159
Indeed, nonmarket mechanisms already existed in the past and are
not new phenomena of IT markets. Helping a friend to move to a new
apartment or providing a neighbor a cup of sugar are just a few examples
for such nonmarket mechanisms. Previously, the role of such nonmarket
production mechanisms, however, was quite minor in light of the need
for high physical and financial capital for enabling the creation and distribution of information goods. Hence, it did not have much effect on
competition in traditional markets.160
Today, nonmarket mechanisms for the production of information
and knowledge take a far greater role in IT markets than in traditional
markets.161 Furthermore, nonmarket based information production
models are here to stay, and their role in the production of information is
about to increase.162
2. The Importance of Nonmarket Information Production Models in IT
Markets
Nonmarket based information production mechanisms are an important and distinctive feature of IT markets.163 Nonmarket based information production mechanisms present a new source of competition in
IT markets.164 The new source of competition is not the familiar outcome of R&D efforts conducted by commercial firms, governmental
funded entities, or research institutions. It is an additional and new
source of competition whose origins are outside the familiar commercial
structure of traditional markets and should be taken into account as a
real and efficient alternative to market based information production
mechanisms.165
158. Yelp, http://www.yelp.com (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
159. Claire Cain Miller, The Review Site Yelp Draws Some Outcries of Its Own, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/technology/
start-ups/03yelp.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
160. See generally BENKLER, supra note 17, at 59-90 (discussing peer production and
product sharing).
161. See generally Id. at 359-90 (discussing peer production and product sharing).
162. Id. at 105-06. Large commercial firms are leaning upon such nonmarket based
information production mechanisms for the provision of customers’ service. Steve Louhr,
Customer Service? Ask a Volunteer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2009, at BU4, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/04/26/business/26unbox.html.
163. BENKLER, supra note 17, at 68.
164. Id. at 122-23.
165. Id. at 108-09.
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The market of web browsers provides a good example for the enhancement of dynamic competition through nonmarket based information production mechanisms.166 Firefox, a free, open-source web
browser, was first introduced into the market in 2004 by two young developers, Dave Hyatt and Blake Ross.167 Over the years, it has become
more popular, introducing security standards and features that were not
offered by the dominant browser, Microsoft’s Internet Explorer.168 After
three years, in November 2007, Firefox’s market share was 14.45% and
Explorer’s was 79.26%.169 Firefox continues to remain competitive with
Microsoft in the web browser market, taking a larger market share away
from Explorer’s dominance in the browser market.170
Furthermore, nonmarket information production mechanisms introduce new and innovative information goods produced by individual
users, thus adding to the variety of information goods produced by commercial firms.171 For example, Encyclopedia Britannica introduced a
new feature to its online version, allowing its users to edit its online content.172 Microsoft also responded to the competition it faces in the web
browser market by introducing the tabbed browsing feature in its Internet Explorer version 7, released in 2006, a feature long used by
Firefox.173
Moreover, when the source of competition is peer production
nonmarket mechanisms, it is difficult to define the relevant market and
predict its scope. Unlike traditional markets, where the identity of the
competitors can be deduced from the existing commercial firms in the
market, the source of competition in IT markets is unknown.174 In addi166. Id. at 56-58.
167. JESSICA LIVINGSTON, FOUNDERS AT WORK: STORIES OF STARTUPS’ EARLY DAYS 395
(2007).
168. Josh McHugh, The Firefox Explosion, WIRED, Feb. 2005, available at http://www.
wired.com/wired/archive/13.02/firefox.html.
169. Net Applications Browser Market Share for November 2007, http://marketshare.
hitslink.com/browser-market-share.aspx?qprid=0&qpmr=100&qpdt=1&qpct=0&qptime
frame=M&qpsp=102&qpnp=1(last (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
170. See Net Applications Browser Market Share for January 2010, http://marketshare.
hitslink.com/browser-market-share.aspx?qprid=0&qpmr=100&qpdt=1&qpct=0&qpcal=1&
qpcal=1&qptimeframe=M&qpsp=133 (last visited Feb. 24, 2010). Firefox’s market share
increased to 24.43%, while Microsoft Explorer’s market share declined to 62.12%. Id.
171. BENKLER, supra note 17, at 126-27.
172. Stephen Hutcheon, Watch out Wikipedia, Here Comes Britannica 2.0, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD (Jan. 22, 2009), available at http://www.smh.com.au/news/technology/
biztech/watch-out-wikipedia-here-comes-britannica-20/2009/01/22/1232471469973.html.
173. Robert Vamosi, Internet Explorer v. 7 v. Firefox 2, CNET REVIEWS, http://reviews.
cnet.com/4520-10442_7-6656808-1.html?tag=hed (last visited Feb. 24, 2010). The tabs feature is the little labels living above the site currently browsed. The tabs allow browsing
multiple sites at once.
174. See generally BENKLER, supra note 17.
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tion, the products in the IT market are not predictable and change rapidly. The competition in IT markets is not only between existing
participants with respect to known and substitutable products;175 competition in IT markets is also between unknown individuals, commercial
firms, or products not yet in the market.176 Products not yet in the market cannot be products that are substitutable. It is difficult, therefore, to
define in advance the relevant IT market.177
In light of the abovementioned implications of nonmarket based information production mechanisms, any economic analysis of an IT market must consider the dynamic nature of the competition in IT markets
as well as the existence of nonmarket based information production
mechanisms. Analysis of the conceptual framework of antitrust law and
of copyright law for regulating IT markets should also consider these
factors.178
In this article, however, I will only discuss the regulation of anticompetitive behaviors under the DRM/DMCA regime, which is a narrower
aspect of the conceptual framework of antitrust law and of copyright law
for regulating IT markets. The regulation of anticompetitive behaviors
under the DRM/DMCA regime will be discussed in light of the dynamic
feature of competition in IT markets and the significant role nonmarket
based information production models play in such markets. In order to
delve into the examination of this narrow matter, I will first present in
the following section several case study behaviors under the umbrella of
the DRM/DMCA regime.
IV. ANTI-COMPETITIVE USE OF THE DRM/DMCA REGIME
In IT markets, anticompetitive behaviors may be defined as any behavior aimed at controlling and reducing the continuing development of
innovative technologies and products.179 This section will explore several examples that show how the DRM/DMCA regime may facilitate anticompetitive behaviors. These examples will serve as my case studies
for the examination of the limits of the conceptual framework of antitrust law and of copyright law for regulating IT markets in the next
sections.

175. Sidak & Teece, supra note 119, at 614-16.
176. MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: HARNESSING
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW 31 (2009).
177. GLADER, supra note 18, at 27.
178. BENKLER, supra note 17, at 108-09.
179. GLADER, supra note 18, at 28.

THE

POWER
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A. KALEIDESCAPE
Kaleidescape, a technology company founded in 2001 in Sunnyvale,
California, developed the Kaleidescape System. The Kaleidescape System is an expensive tool for storing, indexing, organizing, searching, and
playing DVDs. It allows consumers to store a vast amount of video files
by making a secure, private copy on a hard disk drive of every DVD that
the consumer uploads. The system then allows the consumers to play
back the stored files, without the need to reinsert the DVD, in any room
within the consumer’s house.180
The Kaleidescape System is not accessible via the Internet; hence,
the content stored on it cannot be transformed or shared via the Internet.181 Furthermore, Kaleidescape designed its system so that
decrypted copied content could not be pirated. However, the system cannot distinguish between a DVD owned by the user and one borrowed or
rented. Therefore, the system copies content from any DVD a user inserts into the system.
Kaleidescape sought to prevent illegal use of its system through contractual means. It required all purchasers of the Kaleidescape System to
sign an agreement by which they agree to import content only from
DVDs they own. Moreover, the Kaleidescape System reminds the user of
their promise each time a user imports a new DVD, requesting a user to
confirm that she owns the DVD and will otherwise delete the unauthorized content of the DVD from the Kaleidescape System.182
In order to manufacture and distribute the Kaleidescape System,
which is a CSS enabled DVD product, Kaleidescape obtained the CSS
License. It invested substantial efforts in order to comply with the CSS
License restrictions and to keep the CSS protection on any video file
stored on its system.183 In December 2004, the DVD CCA filed a lawsuit
against Kaleidescape for breach of the CSS license. According to the
DVD CCA, the Kaleidescape System’s purpose was to allow illegal copying of DVDs. This purpose directly contradicted the explicit purpose of
the CSS License to prevent the wholesale copying of protected DVDs.184
On March 29, 2007, after a seven day trial, Judge Leslie C. Nichols
of the Santa Clara Superior Court in California dismissed the lawsuit
and held that the document (known as the “General Specification”),
which details the technical specifications required for the implementa180. See Kaleidescape, Products, http://www.kaleidescape.com/products/ (last visited
Feb. 24, 2010).
181. See Id.
182. DVD Copy Control Ass’n Inc. v. Kaleidescape, Inc., 176 Cal. App. 4th 697, 704 (6th
Dist. 2009).
183. Jacobson, supra note 108.
184. Borland, supra note 36.
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tion of the CSS within the licensee’s technology was not part of the CSS
license agreement. Therefore, Kaleidescape did not breach the CSS license agreement.185 The Court of Appeal of the State of California reversed this ruling.186
The Court of Appeal interpreted the parties’ mutual intent at the
time the CSS license agreement was signed. The court concluded that
the parties meant to treat the “General Specification” as an integral part
of the CSS license agreement. Therefore, the Court of Appeal remanded
the case back to the trial court to determine whether Kaleidescape
breached the CSS license agreement, including the “General
Specification.”187
Although the Court of Appeal’s ruling examined the contractual
matter, it may impose serious obstacles on future innovation. The Court
of Appeal described the Kaleidescape System as mainly facilitating infringing use by allowing “users to make permanent copies of borrowed or
rented DVDs so that a user could amass a sizeable DVD library without
purchasing a single DVD.”188 The court reached this conclusion without
addressing possible implications of the DRM/DMCA regime, examining
the technological architecture of the Kaleidescape System or balancing
the interests of copyright owners and the public.
This ruling may have destructive implications on future innovation.
A technology entrepreneur company that wishes to develop a DVD recording device would have to develop a technology that complies with the
technical specifications set forth years earlier by the DVD CCA. Among
the main members of the DVD CCA are the Hollywood studios as well as
top consumer electronics manufacturers and computer makers in the industry.189 Thus, the mandatory technical specifications would likely impose strong copyright protection standards and reflect the interests of
the major and powerful hi-tech firms in the industry. As a result, the
scope of innovative technologies that are allowed to be developed would
be strictly limited to those that will not impose serious threats on the
dominant position of the major and powerful hi-tech firms in the industry. Furthermore, all future technologies would have to comply with
overly broad copyright protection standards. Therefore, this ruling imposes serious setbacks on any hi-tech entrepreneur attempting to develop the next innovative “killer” application and compete with the major
technology companies currently operating in the same market.
185. DVD CCA v. Kaleidescape, Santa Clara Superior Court, California, Statement of
Decision, available at http://www.kaleidescape.com/files/legal/DVDCCA-vs-KaleidescapeStatement-of-Decision.pdf.
186. Kaleidescape, 176 Cal. App. 4th 697.
187. Id. at 727.
188. Id. at 729.
189. See Jacobson, supra note 108.
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Only Judge Rushing in his concurring opinion seemed to balance between the interests of the copyright owners and the importance of future
innovation. Judge Rushing concluded that the Kaleidescape System was
not “designed or intended to facilitate the theft of intellectual property.”190 Rather, the possibility to create unauthorized copies of copyright protected content using the Kaleidescape System is only an
incidental effect. Moreover, such ability is identical, according to Judge
Rushing, to the use of “an ordinary personal computer with freely available DVD-copying software” which is far more powerful and much cheaper
than the Kaleidescape System.191 Judge Rushing further emphasized
that unlike all other widely available PC and DVD-copying software,
Kaleidescape made every effort to warn consumers from illegally using
the Kaleidescape System.192 Moreover, Judge Rushing noted that the
Kaleidescape System allows the user to create only one copy of a DVD
and that copy resides only on the Kaleidescape System itself, while using
an ordinary PC with DVD copying software allows a user to create as
many illegal copies as they want.193
Judge Rushing, therefore, concluded that Kaleidescape should not
be condemned for “marketing a system that, as an incident of its core
function, stores a copy of a DVD’s content on a secure hard drive.”194
Judge Rushing’s concurring opinion resembles in its rationale the Sony
safe harbor, a judicially made defense argument based on the Supreme
Court’s ruling in the Sony Corp v. Universal City Studios.195 According
to the Sony safe harbor, a manufacturer of a technological device would
not be liable for copyright infringement using its device, if its device is
capable of substantial non-infringing uses.196 The Court’s decision in
Sony was motivated by several important policy considerations. The
goal of the Court was to strike the correct balance between the need to
provide copyright holders adequate protection of their statutory monopoly and the right of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated
areas of commerce.197 The same policy consideration should be taken
into account today in order to minimize the negative ramifications of the
DRM/DMCA regime and the strengthening of the rights of the copyright
owners.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
(1984).
196.
197.

Kaleidescape, 176 Cal. App. 4th at 728.
Id. at 729-30.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 885.
See Sony Corp. of Am., et. al. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., et. al., 464 U.S. 417
See Id.
See Id. at 442.
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B. REALNETWORKS
Following the trial court ruling in Kaleidescape, RealNetworks developed, marketed, and distributed a software product internally called
Vegas. Vegas was available for download on any personal computer with
the Microsoft Windows operating system.198 Vegas was capable of making a copy of any CSS-protected DVD on a personal computer hard drive,
laptop computer, or portable hard drive. This software would then allow
the user to play back the copied content without the DVD.199 In addition, Vegas had several other features, including looking up information
about the specific film, TV series, or other creative content on the DVD
from an Internet database.200
RealNetworks also began developing a new hardware product whose
software was based on Vegas. The new hardware platform, internally
named Facet, was designed by RealNetworks as the “next generation”
DVD player. Similar to the Kaleidescape System, it was intended to allow its users to save a CSS-protected DVD on its internal hard drive. It
would then organize and playback the saved DVD without the need of
the physical DVD. Because Vegas and Facet’s software functioned the
same way, the court chose to refer to both the Facet and Vegas programs
as RealDVD.201
RealDVD was capable of avoiding any interference in the DVD ripping process caused by either ARccOS or RipGuard software used by
movies studios to prevent DVD ripping.202 Nevertheless, RealDVD was
designed to preserve the CSS content encryption and to add an additional and stronger encryption called the Advanced Encryption System
(“AES”). The Advanced Encryption System is far more secure and difficult to crack than CSS. Moreover, because both the master keys to that
AES encryption are held by RealNetworks, copies of DVDs made by the
RealDVD products can only be played back by RealDVD software.203
RealDVD’s end user license agreement restricted the use of the
software to DVDs that are legally owned by the user.204 However, as the
court concluded, there was no way for RealDVD software products to
avoid making copies of rented or borrowed DVDs. RealDVD software
products were not capable of distinguishing between DVDs legally owned
by a user and DVDs borrowed or rented by a user.205
198.
199.
puters
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

RealNetworks, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 924.
See Id. A user was capable of making copies of a stored DVD on up to five comthat contained Vegas and were registered under the same user’s license key. Id.
Id.
Id. at 924-25.
Id. at 929-30.
Id. at 927.
RealNetworks, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 926.
Id. at 926-27.
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In September 2008, certain movie studios and the DVD CCA filed a
lawsuit against RealNetworks seeking to prevent it from marketing the
RealDVD software product. The movie studios claimed that
RealNetworks breached the CSS License and violated Section 1201(a)(2)
of the DMCA by circumventing the CSS.206 As described in Section
II.B.2. supra, Section 1201(a)(2) of the DMCA prohibits, among other
things, manufacturing and trafficking a technology knowing that such
technology can be used for circumventing a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a copyrighted work.207 In order to prevail
on a DMCA claim for violation of the access-control provision based on
circumvention of CSS technology, it is necessary, therefore, to show that
CSS is a “technological measure” that “effectively controls access” to
copyrighted works. A technological measure that effectively controls access to a copyrighted work is defined in Section 1201(a)(3)(B) as a measure that imposes certain requirements prior to obtaining access to a
copyrighted work.208 RealNetworks argued, in its defense, that because
the CSS had been hacked years before the development of RealDVD
products, the CSS does not “effectively control” access to a copyrighted
work in the manner defined by the DMCA.209 Therefore, RealNetworks
argued that the movie studios and the DVD CCA could not prevail on
their claim for DMCA violation.210 The court rejected RealNetworks’ argument, holding that the test for determining whether a measure effectively controls access to a copyrighted work is whether it provides access
to a work in its ordinary course of operation and with the authority of the
copyright owner.211 The fact that the measure had been hacked and the
keys for circumventing it were made available over the Internet is not
sufficient to invalidate it as a measure that effectively controls access to
a copyrighted work.212
Following that determination, the court examined whether
RealDVD circumvents the CSS technology without the authorization of
the copyright owners.213 RealDVD’s main purpose, as admitted by
RealNetworks, was to allow its users to create copies of DVDs to computer hard drives and play back those DVDs without the physical copy of
206. Id. at 917.
207. See 17 U.S.C § 1201(a)(2).
208. “[A] technological measure “effectively controls access to a work” if the measure, in
the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of information, or a process or
a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work.” Id. at
§1201(a)(3)(B).
209. RealNetworks, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 932-34.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See Id.
213. Id. at 935-37.
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the DVD.214 In order to create a copy of a DVD, RealDVD circumvents
the CSS.215 The CSS license agreement permits a licensee to circumvent
the CSS technology only for the purpose of reading the physical copy of a
DVD in order to play it on a DVD player.216 Therefore, RealDVD’s circumvention for the purpose of playing the DVD directly from a computer
hard drive without the physical copy of the DVD was not permitted
under the CSS license agreement and was done without authorization
from the copyright owners.217 Furthermore, the court held that
RealDVD’s circumvention of the CSS technology was also a violation of
the DMCA. The DMCA’s purpose is to protect the right of copyright owners “to decide who may gain access to their copyright works in digital
format.”218 Determining that the purpose of the DMCA is to protect copyright owners’ right to control the access to their copyrighted work further confirms the allegation that the DRM/DMCA regime gives copyright
owners a new and strong right: the right to control any access, even if the
purpose is for fair use, to their protected work.219
The court continued strengthening the rights of copyright owners
when it rejected RealNetworks’ Sony safe harbor defense that the circumvention of the CSS was done for the purpose of fair use.220 The court
cited the holding in Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes and noted that
“Sony came down before the DMCA was enacted and, thus, is superseded
to the extent that the DMCA broadened copyright owners’ rights beyond
the Sony holding.”221 Furthermore, the court reasoned that because
RealNetworks’ technology is different from the technology at the time
Sony was decided, RealNetworks cannot rely on the Sony safe harbor
defense in order to establish a new form of time shifting under the
DMCA. The court further held that the fair use defense provides an exemption only from liability under section 1201(b) of the DMCA.222 Thus,
only a circumvention of a copy protection measure by an individual can
be considered fair use.
The court explained, “the DMCA’s ‘user exemption’ is only for the
individual who has gained authorized access and who may circumvent
the protection measures pursuant to lawful conduct, such as to make fair
use of the subject work.”223 According to this holding, under the DRM/
214. Id. at 935.
215. RealNetworks, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 935.
216. Id. at 936.
217. Id. at 936-37.
218. Id. at 936.
219. Id. at 935.
220. Id. at 936-37 (N.D. Cal. 2009). See Sony, 464 U.S. 417.
221. RealNetworks, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 942 (citing Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes,
11 F. Supp. 2d 294, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
222. Id.
223. Id. (citing Reimerdes, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 323).
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DMCA regime, in order to perform fair use, it is necessary to obtain access to the digital format of the copyrighted content.224 A user can no
longer perform a fair use of protected content without having purchased
access to the whole work in a digital format.
The court was perfectly aware that its ruling would strengthen the
copyright owners set of rights.225 According to the court, it was bound to
hold this new balance as long as it followed the balance set forth by Congress while enacting the DMCA.226 The “DMCA re-balanced the competing interests of copyright owners against copyright users” and “tipped
the balance towards copyright owners.”227 The court has no discretion to
change this balance by weighting the public interest as a factor in determining whether RealDVD circumvents the DMCA or not.228
C. LEXMARK
Lexmark has also tried to take advantage of the DRM/DMCA regime.229 Lexmark divided the market for toner cartridges according to
the type of consumer.230 Regular consumers were offered non-prebate
toner cartridges, which were sold free of any use restriction and were
available for refill by any third party.231 Business consumers were entitled to prebate cartridges that were sold at an upfront discount.232 The
prebate cartridges were subject to several restrictions that were detailed
on the shrink-wrap license agreement.233 One of these restrictions demanded business consumers to only refill the prebated cartridges with
Lexmark ink.234 This restriction was technologically anchored via a
DRM measure in the form of an authentication sequence that performed
a secret “handshake” between the Lexmark printer and a microchip on
each Lexmark toner cartridge.235
Static Control Components (“SCC”) mimicked Lexmark’s computer
chip and created the Smartek chip that broke the Lexmark authentication code, and thus, caused Lexmark printers to operate even if the cartridge was not refilled by Lexmark.236 SCC sold its Smartek chip to
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. RealNetworks, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 943.
228. Id. at 942-43.
229. Lexmark Int’l., Inc., v. Static Control Components, Inc. (Lexmark II), 387 F.3d 522
(6th Cir. 2004).
230. Id. at 529-31.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. As claimed by SCC. See Id. at 529-31.
235. Lexmark II, 387 F.3d at 529-31.
236. Id.
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companies interested in selling remanufactured toner cartridges to customers of Lexmark printers.237
Lexmark filed a lawsuit against SCC, claiming, among other counts,
that SCC violated the DMCA, by circumventing a technological measure
designed to control access to the Toner Loading Program, and violated
the DMCA by circumventing a technological measure designed to control
access to the Printer Engine Program.238 The court did not analyze
Lexmark’s behavior under antitrust law.239 However, Judge Sutton
from the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit criticized Lexmark’s use
of the DRM/DMCA regime and noted that:
Nowhere in its deliberations over the DMCA did Congress express an
interest in creating liability for the circumvention of technological measures designed to prevent consumers from using consumer goods while
leaving the copyrightable content of a work unprotected. In fact, Congress added the interoperability provision in part to ensure that the
DMCA would not diminish the benefit to consumers of interoperable
devices “in the consumer electronics environment.240

Concurring with the ruling, Judge Merritt revealed Lexmark’s intention to stifle competition and hinder innovation by using the DRM/
DMCA regime. In Judge Merritt’s words:
Congress gives authors and programmers exclusive rights to their expressive works (for a limited time) so that they will have an incentive to
create works that promote progress. Lexmark’s reading of the extent of
these rights, however, would clearly stifle rather than promote progress. It would allow authors exclusive control over not only their own
expression, but also over whatever functional use they can make of that
expression in manufactured goods. Giving authors monopolies over
manufactured goods as well as over their creative expressions will
clearly not ‘promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts,’ but
rather would stifle progress by stamping out competition from manufacturers who may be able to design better or less expensive replacement
parts like toner cartridges.241

D. CHAMBERLAIN
Another example for an attempt to stifle competition using the
DRM/DMCA regime is Chamberlain v. Skylink.242 Chamberlain develops, manufactures, and markets a garage door opener system that consists of a handheld portable transmitter and a garage door opening
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
2004).

Id.
Id.
Id. at 549 (6th Cir. 2004).
See Id.; 144 Cong. Rec. E2136 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1998) (remarks of Rep. Bliley).
See Lexmark II, 387 F.3d at 553.
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir.
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device mounted in the homeowner’s garage.243 The opening device includes both a receiver with an associated signal processing software and
a motor to open or close the garage door.244 In order to open or close the
garage door, a user must activate the transmitter, which sends a radio
frequency signal to the receiver, located on the opening device.245 Once
the opener receives a recognized signal, the signal processing software
directs the motor to open or close the garage door.246
Usually, the manufacturer of a garage door opener system provides
the customers with both the opening device and a transmitter.247 However, universal transmitters, which could be interoperated with any garage door opener system, regardless of its brand and model, are available
for purchase in the aftermarket.248
Skylink developed a universal garage door opener that allowed its
users to open Chamberlain’s garage door.249 It is important to note that
Skylink and Chamberlain were the only significant distributors of universal garage door opener transmitters in the U.S. market.250 Chamberlain contended that by manufacturing and marketing the garage door
opener, Skylink violated Section 1201(a)(2) of the DMCA, the anti-trafficking provision.251 Skylink’s garage door opener circumvents Chamberlain’s rolling code, which is a technological protection measure that
effectively controls the access to Chamberlain’s copyrighted software incorporated within Chamberlain’s garage door system.252 Chamberlain
further argued that Skylink’s garage door opener has no other significant commercial purpose other than circumventing Chamberlain’s rolling code.253
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court’s ruling dismissing Chamberlain’s lawsuit.254 The Court of Appeals did not perform an antitrust law analysis.255 However, the Court
of Appeals did emphasize the hazardous implications on competition associated with accepting Chamberlain’s position that the DRM/DMCA regime creates a new protection for copyrighted works, i.e. access to the
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. at 1183.
Id.
Id.
See Id.
Id.
Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1183.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1185.
Id. at 1183-85.
Id. at 1183.
Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1181-82.
See generally Id.
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copyrighted work.256 In the court’s words, “Chamberlain’s construction
of the DMCA would allow virtually any company to attempt to leverage
its sales into aftermarket monopolies — a practice that both antitrust
law. . . and the doctrine of copyright misuse. . . normally prohibit.”257
E. ANTITRUST LAW

TO THE

RESCUE?

In light of these described attempts to use the DRM/DMCA regime
in an anticompetitive manner, there are also constant attempts to call
antitrust law to the rescue. Antitrust law is regarded as the final resort
for securing competition in IT markets.
In Kaleidescape, Kaleidescape’s CEO, Mr. Michael Malcolm, warned
the DVD CCA that by requiring a physical copy of a DVD as a condition
to play back the content of such DVD, the DVD CCA might expose itself
to liability for a violation of antitrust law.258 However, he did not specify
in his allegation the exact antitrust law section violated by the DVD
CCA.259
Contrary to Kaleidescape, RealNetwortks did go further with its antitrust violation allegations and filed a lawsuit against the DVD CCA
and several major movie studios in the District Court of the Northern
District of California.260 In its lawsuit, RealNetworks argued that the
DVD CCA and several major movie studios violated the antitrust law
due to, among other things, their anticompetitive behavior.261 As shall
be further discussed in Section V.D. infra, the court, however, dismissed
RealNetworks’ allegation without performing a thorough discussion of
the implications of the unique features of IT markets on antitrust law
analysis and enforcement.262
In Lexmark, SCC also alleged an antitrust violation.263 SCC contended that Lexmark’s actions were of an anticompetitive nature and an
attempt to monopolize the market of remanufactured toner cartridges.264 Furthermore, in the preliminary injunction ruling, the district court examined SCC’s copyright misuse defense.265 In order to
256. Id. at 1201.
257. Id.
258. Jacobson, supra note 108.
259. Id.
260. RealNetworks, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
261. Id. at 932-34.
262. Id. at 942-43.
263. See First Amended Complaint, Lexmark Int’l, Inc., v. Static Control Components,
Inc., No. 1:02CV01057 (M.D.N.C. 2004), available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/
Lexmark_v_Static_Control/antitrust_complaint.pdf.
264. Id.
265. Lexmark Int’l., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. (Lexmark I), 253 F. Supp.
2d 943 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
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establish a copyright misuse defense, the defendant must show either a
violation of antitrust law, illegal extension of the monopoly granted to
the plaintiff under copyright law, or a violation of the public policies underlying copyright law.266 While reviewing the facts of the case, the district court held that SCC did not present any factual or legal basis for its
argument that Lexmark violated antitrust law and that Lexmark’s prebate software was anticompetitive.267 The district court further concluded that based on the facts presented to it, Lexmark did not attempt
to illegally extend its granted monopoly under copyright law.268 Rather,
the court described Lexmark’s actions as an attempt to enforce and protect the access to Lexmark’s copyrighted work.269 Thus, the court rejected the argument that Lexmark misused its copyrights or used the
DRM/DMCA regime as a means to stifle competition.270
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit did not address the allegation of an antitrust violation directly, although Judge Merritt in his
concurring opinion did mention competition considerations and the effect
on further innovation while applying the DMCA anti-circumvention
rules.271 Judge Merritt also addressed concerns that interpreting the
DMCA as shifting the burden of proof to the defendant to prove it operated under one of the DMCA or copyright exceptions may lead to devastating implications on future innovation.272 He stated:
Misreading the statute to shift the burden in this way could allow powerful manufacturers in practice to create monopolies where they are not
in principle supported by law. Instead, a better reading of the statute is
that it requires plaintiffs as part of their burden of pleading and persuasion to show a purpose to pirate on the part of defendants. Only then
need the defendants invoke the statutory exceptions, such as the reverse engineering exception.273

In Chamberlain, Chamberlain advocated the interpretation that the
DMCA nullified and superseded “all pre-existing consumer expectations
about the legitimate uses of products containing copyrighted embedded
software.”274 Therefore, according to Chamberlain, the DMCA permitted “manufacturers to prohibit consumers from using embedded software
products in conjunction with competing products,”275 unless the manu266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 966.
Id. at 965-66.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lexmark II, 387 F.3d at 552-3 (2004).
Id.
Id.
Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1193.
Id.
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facturer explicitly authorized consumers to do so.276
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the practical
implications of Chamberlain’s interpretation of the DMCA would be
granting “manufacturers broad exemptions from both the antitrust laws
and the doctrine of copyright misuse.”277 Moreover, the court noted that
“Chamberlain’s construction of the DMCA would allow virtually any
company to attempt to leverage its sales into aftermarket monopolies – a
practice that both the antitrust laws and the doctrine of copyright misuse normally prohibit.”278
With respect to the intersection between copyright law and antitrust
law, the court repeated its previous holdings279 and stated that “intellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to violate the antitrust
laws,” and antitrust law does not deny the right of an intellectual property owner to exclude others from its property.280 Furthermore, the
court concluded that “the DMCA, as part of the Copyright Act, does not
limit the scope of the antitrust laws, either explicitly or implicitly” and
that there is no plain repugnancy between the antitrust laws and the
DMCA which justifies supremacy or cancellation of antitrust law in light
of the DMCA.281
F. SUMMARY
Regulation of IT markets using antitrust law is not unique to the
circumstances fostered by the DRM/DMCA regime. Companies like
Microsoft, the giant software developer,282 Google, the giant search engine,283 Intel, the big PC based chips manufacturer284 and AOL,285 one
of the major Internet based service providers in the U.S., found them276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
280. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1193.
281. Id. at 1201-02.
282. United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft I), 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999);
United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft II), 87 F. Supp 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000); United
States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft III), 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.2001).
283. The Justice Department submitted views on the original and the amended settlement agreement between Google and the groups of authors and publishers regarding
Google Books. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT SUBMITTED VIEWS ON
AMENDED GOOGLE BOOKS SEARCH SETTLEMENT, available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2010/February/10-opa-128.html.
284. Dawn Kawamoto & Michael Singer, AMD Files an Antitrust Suit against Intel,
CNET NEWS (June 28, 2005), http://www.news.com/AMD-files-antitrust-suit-against-Intel/
2100-1001_3-5765844.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2010); Reuters, EC Takes Antitrust Steps
against Intel, ZDNET NEWS (Apr. 24, 2009), http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22291618.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
285. Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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selves in the past fifteen years defending their actions against antitrust
violation allegations.
So far, however, none of the attempts to find an adequate solution to
the anticompetitive use of the DRM/DMCA regime has led to a substantial discussion in courts regarding the application of antitrust law to
what is perceived as anticompetitive effects of the DRM/DMCA regime in
IT markets. I will now turn to examine the limits of the conceptual
framework of antitrust law for regulating anticompetitive use of the
DRM/DMCA regime in IT markets in the United States.
V. ANTITRUST LAWS – THE RIGHT DRUG FOR CURING
MARKET FAILURE?
The suitability of antitrust laws to regulating dynamic competition
has already been examined by several scholars.286 In this article, I
would like to examine the limits of the conceptual framework of antitrust
law for regulating anticompetitive uses of the DRM/DMCA regime not
only in light of the dynamic feature of competition in IT markets and the
fact it is usually a data market, but also given the significant role
nonmarket based information production mechanisms play in IT markets. So far, no thorough analysis of this matter has been performed.
I will start by exploring the conceptual framework governing the application of antitrust law. Thereafter, I will continue by examining the
practical application of antitrust law according to this conceptual framework for regulating anticompetitive uses of the DRM/DMCA regime.
While examining the application of antitrust law in practice, I shall take
into consideration the treatment accorded to the IT market in the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property287 and the report on Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property288 issued by the
Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (the “agencies”). I will also examine the way
courts applied antitrust laws to intellectual property cases.

286. See also Daniel L. Rubinfeld & John Hoven, Innovation and Antitrust Enforcement,
in DYNAMIC COMPETITION AND PUBLIC POLICY 65 (Jerry Ellig, ed., 2001); Pleatsikas & Teece,
supra note 16, at 95; Evans, supra note 16.
287. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & THE FED. TRADE COMM’N ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm [hereinafter ANTITRUST GUIDELINES].
288. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION (2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/P040101PromotingInnovationandCompetitionrpt
0704.pdf [hereinafter ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT].
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ANTITRUST LAWS

While framing the Sherman Act,289 Congress did not provide a clear
definition or explanation for the conceptual framework or purpose of the
law. Rather, Congress applied a broad language prohibiting all sorts of
activity “in restraint of trade,”290 leaving the task of providing the exact
purpose of the law to the courts.291
As economic thinking became more and more widespread and economic analysis of the law in general turned to be very common, economic
analysis of antitrust law became prevalent as well. Antitrust policy was
influenced by different approaches of economic analyses of the market.292 I shall further explore the current controlling economic
reasoning.293
1. Chicago School Era
At the beginning of the mid-1970s, the Chicago School Approach, a
neoclassical economic theory, had a tremendous influence on antitrust
policy.294 The Chicago School Approach was the rational choice theory.295 According to the rational choice theory, human beings, either individually or collectively, operate out of their rational desire to maximize
their ends in life. This behavior is termed “self interest” or “utility.”296
The rational choice theory assumes that people are rational, have
willpower, and will act in their own self-interest. Furthermore, since determining that a “rational” choice is difficult and it is a rather moral and
289. ,The Sherman Act 15 U.S.C §§ 1-7 (2009).
290. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
291. Terry Calvani & John Siegfried, Economic Analysis and Antitrust Law 7-10 (2nd
ed., 1988).
292. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 23-29 (7th ed., 2007).
293. A more comprehensive review of the different approaches to economic analysis of
antitrust law is beyond the scope of this article.
294. See James W. Meehan, Jr. & Robert J. Larner, The Structural School, Its Critics,
and Its Progeny: An Assessment, in ECONOMIC AND ANTITRUST POLICY 188-190 (Larner &
Meehan, Jr. eds., 1989) (citing JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 252 (1968)). The
Supreme Court seemed to adopt the Chicago School analysis for the first time in Continental v. Sylvania, where the court held that non-price vertical restraints can enhance economic efficiency as well as reduce competition. Thus such vertical restraints should be
analyzed under the rule of reason and should not be treated as illegal per se. See Continental Con’l T.V., Inc., et. al. v. GTE Sylvania Inc, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). The influence of the
Chicago Schools Approach on judicial analysis of antitrust law became more and more preeminent as several of its most dedicated scholars, such as Robert Bork, Richard Posner and
Frank Easterbrook, became Federal Judges. See Jonathan B. Baker, A Preface to PostChicago Antitrust, in POST-CHICAGO DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 60-66 (Van
Den Bergh, Pardolesi & Cucinotta, eds, 2003).
295. Steven L. Green, Rational Choice Theory: An Overview (May 2002), http://business.
baylor.edu/steve_green/green1.doc (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
296. POSNER, supra note 292, at 3-4.
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ethical question, the rational choice theory assumes that people respond
in a predictable and similar manner to financial incentives and will pursue their material self-interests without caring about social goals per
se.297
Therefore, the rational choice theory advocates for perfect competition where the price equals the marginal costs, as the most adequate
model for achieving efficiency. Perfect competition occurs when the following assumptions are met: (i) all the participants in the market (customers and producers) are well informed and act reasonably, based on
their information298 (for example, producers always know how to maximize their profits); (ii) there are zero transaction costs in the market; and
(iii) no participants in the market can be strong enough to exercise any
market power.299 Accordingly, Aaron Director and Richard Posner emphasized that the appropriate test for examining a certain behavior
under antitrust laws should be whether such conduct enhances the
firm’s ability to restrict output and increase price above the competitive
level.300
Given the unique features of IT markets, however, it seems that the
rational choice theory is unlikely to adequately address anticompetitive
behavior in IT markets.301 The model of perfect competition is a static
model, and according to the rational choice theory, all the products in the
same market are substitutable, as the consumer selects the product she
desires based on its price.
Competition in IT markets is, however, dynamic. Consumers’ selection of innovative goods is influenced by other parameters besides price.
Mostly, a consumer is looking for the innovative feature in the good.302
For example, Apple’s smartphone, the iPhone, was the leading
smartphone sold in the last two quarters of 2008.303 Consumers were
willing to pay the expensive price to purchase an iPhone because it offered the best user experience and easier Internet access compared to
297. Maurice E Stucke, Behavioral Economist at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-First
Century, 138 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 513, 518-521 (2007) (citing George Stigler, Economics of
Ethics?, in TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES (S. McMurrin ed., 1981)).
298. GLADER, supra note18, at 24.
299. Id.
300. See Meehan & Larner, supra note 294, at 188-90.
301. Sidak & Teece, supra note 119, at 588-89.
302. Pleatsikas & Teece, supra note 16, at 111; Evans, supra note 16, at 258-59.
303. In the first quarter of 2009, the BlackBerry Curve, which offers similar features as
the iPhone was said to outsell iPhone in consumers sales, as a result of significant discount
in the price of the Curve and a wider availability of the Curve compared with the iPhone.
Despite these findings, experts say the iPhone is still very popular and profitable. See Tom
Keneshige, Apple iPhone Needs not Fear BlackBerry, PCWORLD, May 8, 2009, http://www.
pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/164585/apple_iphone_need_not_fear_blackberry.html
(last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
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other smartphones at the time.304 Furthermore, as competition in IT
markets is dynamic, it is affected by the abilities of new technologies and
technologies not yet in the market (in-development technologies), developed either by commercial firms, individuals or via peer production, to
access into and compete in the market.305 The ability to enter an IT
market is affected by many factors such as compatibility with the controlling technical standards in the virtual network. Thus, a test that focuses only on a firm’s ability to restrict output and increase price above
the competitive level seems ill-suited for securing dynamic competition
in IT markets.
Moreover, in IT markets, the lack of monetary incentives for the production of information goods may not have an actual or noticeable effect
on the production of information goods. In light of the significant role
nonmarket information production models have in IT markets, the production of information goods, for example, the content contributed by
users to Wikipedia,306 is not always driven or induced by monetary
incentives.307
In conclusion, the rational choice theory does not seem to apply to
the needs and characteristics of IT markets. However, the significant
role nonmarket production mechanisms play in IT markets and the dynamic character of IT markets, render it difficult to identify and determine what should be the most efficient market structure and competition
level in such markets.308 Furthermore, there has not been a decisive
conclusion regarding the adequate market structure and competition
level that will efficiently encourage innovation and will lead to a socially
optimal rate of economic growth.309
304. Posting of Seth Weintraub, EETimes: iPhone success? “It’s the User Experience,
Stupid,” COMPUTERWORLD BLOGS (Feb. 15, 2008), http://blogs.computerworld.com/eetimes_
iphone_success_its_the_user_experience_stupid (last visited Feb. 24, 2010). As other firms
develop smartphones with similar features and offer their smartphone devices at a similar
price, iPhone popularity may decline. See Jenna Wortham, Palm’s Pre Already Wins the
Wallet Wars, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2009, available at http://gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.com/
2009/06/03/palms-pre-already-wins-the-wallet-wars/?partner=rss&emc=rss (last visited
Feb. 24, 2010).
305. GLADER, supra note 18, at 26-47.
306. See Wikipedia, www.wikipedia.com (last visited Feb. 24, 2010 12:00 GMT).
307. According to the Swiss economist, Bruno Frey, motivation is driven by extrinsic
motivation, such as money or fear of punishment, and intrinsic motivation, mainly socialpsychological rewards. The production of information goods in nonmarket production models seems to be driven by such intrinsic motivation. See BENKLER, supra note 17, at 92-99.
308. Susan DeSanti & William Cohen, Competition to Innovate: Strategies for Proper
Antitrust Assessments, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 327
(Dreyfuss, et al., eds., 2001); Sidak & Teece, supra note 119, at 588-89.
309. GLADER, supra note 18; DeSanti & Cohen, supra note 308, at 317.
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B. THE PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
OF ANTITRUST LAWS
As discussed in Section V.A. supra, the conceptual framework of antitrust law based on the rational choice theory does not seem to appropriately address the unique features of IT markets. It is necessary,
however, to examine the manner in which courts and the agencies applied the rational choice theory to the enforcement of the antitrust laws
with respect to intellectual property rights.310
1. The Agencies’ Guidelines
The agencies issued several guidelines during the years regarding
the appropriate standards for enforcing antitrust laws with respect to
certain behaviors in IT markets.311 Although the guidelines have no
binding authority over courts, their importance rises as both the agencies and courts abide by it.312
2. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines, issued by the agencies in 1992
and amended in 1997,313 do not specifically address the issue of applying
the antitrust laws to IT markets. The FTC and the Antitrust Division
acknowledged the possible inadequacy of the merger guidelines to dynamic markets. Thus, the FTC and the Antitrust Division decided to
hold a public workshop for examining whether the Merger Guidelines
“should be revised to explain more fully than in the current [version] how
market shares and market concentration are measured and interpreted
in dynamic markets, including markets experiencing significant technological change.”314
There are, however, several instructions in the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines that may have some influence on the enforcement of antitrust
laws in IT markets. First, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines acknowledged the notion that a firm’s market share may not always accurately
reflect the firm’s future competitive significance in a market. For example, in case a firm does not have access to a new technology that is “important to long-term competitive viability,” the firm’s market share may
not necessarily reflect the firm’s competitiveness in the future.
310.
311.
312.
313.

GLADER, supra note 18, at 59-84; DeSanti & Cohen, supra note 308, at 327.
GLADER, supra note 18, at 67.
Id.
FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES:
QUESTIONS FOR PUBLIC COMMENT (Sept. 22, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/hmg/hmg-questions.pdf.
314. Id.

\\server05\productn\S\SFT\27-1\SFT101.txt

46

unknown

Seq: 46

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

24-MAY-10

15:36

[Vol. XXVII

Thus, according to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, in order to assess whether a proposed merger will have an anticompetitive effect on
the market, it is necessary to take into account any predictable effect of
recent or ongoing changes in market conditions on the firm’s estimated
market share.315 These guidelines, therefore, allow the agencies and the
courts to treat any possible outcome of the unique features of dynamic
competition and of the significant role of nonmarket based information
production models as a change in the market condition. However, examining the actual influence of these guidelines is beyond the scope of this
article.
i.

Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property

a.

The General Framework

Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property316 declare as a starting point that antitrust laws and intellectual property
laws share the same purpose: to promote innovation and enhance consumer welfare.317 However, the manner in which the licensing guidelines address intellectual property rights does not seem to properly
address the unique features of the IT market.
First, according to the licensing guidelines, intellectual property
should be treated the same as real property as far as antitrust enforcement is concerned. The special characteristics of intellectual property
can be taken into account within the application of the general principles
of antitrust law.318
When the general framework of antitrust enforcement under the licensing guidelines compares between intellectual property and real
property, it seems that there are only slim chances that the practical
enforcement of antitrust law would properly address the unique features
of the IT market. The flexibility in enforcing antitrust law, which is
highly advocated by the licensing guidelines, is not enough to change it.
When it comes to IT markets, the key to efficient dynamic competition is
the existence of a certain level of development of new inventions and the
ability of new and improved inventions to be developed and produced in
market or nonmarket ways, and to enter the market freely.319 The application of regular antitrust rules, the same rules that apply to regular
property, may override any innovation considerations. I shall further
emphasize this in the following paragraphs.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

Id. at § 1.52.
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 287.
Id. at § 1.
Id. at § 3.
See discussion in Sections III.A and III.B supra.
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The Guidelines for Defining a Market

The starting point for examining a certain license restriction and analyzing whether it is anticompetitive, is defining the relevant market
and licensor’s market power in the relevant market.320 Market power,
according to the licensing guidelines, is not automatically assumed when
the licensor has an intellectual property right.321 Rather, if a licensor
has “the ability profitably to maintain prices above, or output below,
competitive levels for a significant period of time” it will be considered as
having market power.322
Although the agencies acknowledge that market power “can be exercised in other economic dimensions, such as quality, service, and the development of new or improved goods and processes,” it assumes that
under its proposed test for market power all other “competitive dimensions are held constant,” and need not be specifically addressed.323
Thus, the licensing guidelines maintain the focus of antitrust enforcement on the price of a good. By doing so, the licensing guidelines ignore
the dynamic character of competition in IT markets. As explained in
Section III.A., in dynamic competition, the competition is not about who
will produce a product at the lowest price, but rather who will produce
the most innovative product.324
Furthermore, the licensing guidelines also ignore the possibility that
information goods may be produced in nonmarket based information production models. Additionally, not only are such production models not
affected by the price of market based goods, but also nonmarket based
information production models present a new source of competition in
the market and increase the variety of information goods in IT markets.
In addition, a test that focuses on the price of the goods is difficult to
apply when the goods in the market are provided for free. In IT markets,
however, providing free goods or services, produced commercially or by
peers, for free is rather common. The Yahoo e-mail program, the Yahoo
320. The general rule set forth in the licensing guidelines states that the analysis of a
license restriction should be done under the rule of reason that allows the agencies flexibility and leeway. Only if the license restriction’s nature is plainly anticompetitive, it shall be
treated as illegal per se. Under the rule of reason analysis, the agencies shall examine
whether a specific license restriction has an anticompetitive effect and balance such anticompetitive effect against any possible efficiencies resulting from such license restriction.
See ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 287, at § 2.
321. This was the licensing guidelines position long before the Supreme Court officially
changed the market power presumption. The market power presumption was finally rebutted by the Supreme Court in Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S.
28 (2006).
322. ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 287, at § 2.2.
323. Id.
324. Pleatsikas & Teece, supra note 16, at 111; Evans, supra note 16, at 258-599; Sidak
& Teece, supra note 119, at 602.
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search engine, Google search engine, Gmail, Google Chrome, and Google
Chrome operating system, which is an open source system based on
Linux,325 are all provided free of charge. Thus, it seems that under a
test that focuses solely on the price, Google’s or Yahoo’s market power in
a relevant market cannot be properly assessed.
c.

Guidelines for Identifying and Treating Anticompetitive License
Restrictions

1.

Potential Competitors

The licensing guidelines define a possible anticompetitive license restriction as any license restriction that is likely to harm competition
among “potential competitors.” The use of the term “potential competitors” could open the way for including new information goods or information goods not yet in the market, produced by a commercial entity or
peers in the definition of the relevant market. In a dynamic market, the
inclusion of potential competitors is crucial for assessing competition and
performing correct antitrust analysis.326 However, according to the licensing guidelines, only when there is evidence that entry of an entity
into the market is reasonably probable, absent the license restriction,
such an entity should be considered as a potential competitor.327
The requirement for evidence that the entry into the market by an
entity is reasonably probable absent the license restriction raises the bar
and de facto blocks the possibility to include, in the definition of the relevant market, products still in development or products developed in a
nonmarket based manner by many individuals.328 For example, in
United States v. Microsoft, the District Court found that the relevant
market is the market for Intel-compatible PC Operating Systems and
declined to include web portals in its definition of the relevant market.329 The court examined the possibility that web portals will be used
for accessing software applications and held that these days are not yet
here:
The variety and ease of use of server-based applications accessible
through browsers would have to increase a great deal from today’s
levels, however, before the total costs of dispensing with an Intel-compatible PC operating system would decline sufficiently to impose a significant constraint on the pricing of those systems. Again, that day is
not imminent; for at least the next few years, the overwhelming majority of consumers accessing server-based applications will do so using an
325. See Google Blog, Introducing the Google Chrome OS, http://googleblog.blogspot.
com/2009/07/introducing-google-chrome-os.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
326. Sidak & Teece, supra note 119.
327. ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 287, at § 3.2.
328. Sidak & Teece, supra note 119.
329. Microsoft I, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 22.
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Intel-compatible PC system and a browser.330

It is interesting to note that Google, the search engine giant,331 established in 1997,332 is considered today as the major competitor of
Microsoft. Eight years after the Court of Appeals ruling in Microsoft, the
battle is set for the next operating system platform. Both Google and
Microsoft are said to be currently competing for the control of the platform for the next generation of operating systems, which will be a web
based software application.333 Thus, under a less demanding definition
of the relevant market in Microsoft, Google might have been considered
as a “potential competitor” of Microsoft.
2.

The Ability to Develop New or Improved Goods

Another anticompetitive license restriction, according to the licensing guidelines, is a license clause that restricts the ability to develop new
or improved goods. The agencies acknowledged that in certain cases, for
example, when the license clause affects the development of goods not
yet in the market, the effect of a certain license clause on the ability to
develop new or improved goods cannot be adequately addressed through
the regular antitrust analysis of goods or technology markets.334
Therefore, for the purpose of analyzing the effect a license clause
may have on innovation in IT markets, the licensing guidelines define
innovation market (such as IT markets) as a market that consists of “the
research and development directed to particular new or improved goods
or processes, and the close substitutes for that research and development.” The licensing guidelines define close substitutes for R&D as R&D
efforts that (i) can be associated with specialized assets or characteristics
of specific firms and (ii) may significantly restrain the exercise of the
market power with respect to the relevant substitute R&D.335
Under this definition of IT markets and “close substitute R&D,”
products in development may be considered as part of IT markets only if
such products are the probable result of current and known R&D efforts.
330. Id.
331. As of February 2010, Google’s estimated global share in the web search market
was 65.74%, while Yahoo’s global share was 6.09% and Microsoft Bing’s estimated global
share was 3.39%. See NetMarketShare, February 2010 Search Engine Market Share, http:/
/marketshare.hitslink.com/search-engine-market-share.aspx?qprid=4 (last visited Feb. 24,
2010).
332. See Wikipedia, Google, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google#History (last visited
Feb. 24, 2010 12:00 GMT).
333. Google even released its Chrome OS, a Linux based operating system, on July
2009. See Miguel Helft & Ashlee Vance, In Chrome, Hints of a Real Rival to Microsoft, N.Y.
TIMES, July 8, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/09/technology/internet/09google.html.
334. ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 287, at § 3.2.3.
335. Id.
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In many cases, however, it is difficult to predict the outcome of a firm’s
R&D efforts. For example, when initiating the development efforts that
eventually led to the development of the iPhone, Steve Jobs, Apple’s
CEO, was considering entering the tablet PC market. It was even expected in 2003 that Apple would develop a PDA.336 The goal to develop
the iPhone device became apparent only in 2005.337
Furthermore, by defining R&D efforts as associated with specialized
assets or characteristic of a specific firm and limiting the scope of a market definition only to products that will be the probable result of current
and known R&D efforts, the licensing guidelines maintain the focus of
antitrust enforcement on the familiar structure of a market that only
consists of commercial firms. This definition, therefore, ignores the possibility that information goods will be produced in nonmarket based information production mechanisms without having commercially
comprehensive R&D efforts beforehand. For example, the open source
operating system, Linux, started in 1991 as a peer production project
with no R&D.338
3. Safety Zone
The licensing guidelines also provide a “safety zone” in order to provide some level of certainty in IT markets. According to the safety zone:
The Agencies will not challenge a restraint in an intellectual property
licensing arrangement that may affect competition in an innovation
market if (i) the restraint is not facially anticompetitive ( i.e., restraints
that will be considered as illegal per se); and (ii) four or more independently controlled entities, in addition to the parties to the licensing arrangement, possess the required specialized assets or characteristics
and the incentive to engage in research and development that is a close
substitute of the research and development activities of the parties to
the licensing agreement.339

This safety zone seems to specifically address the dynamic characteristic of competition in IT markets by acknowledging that IT markets
should include firms that have the ability to develop a competitive product, even if no known R&D efforts have been commenced. However, the
safety zone seems arbitrary and may perpetuate the dominant control of
the strong and big players in a given IT market. For example, in both
336. Apple, iPhone History and Development, http://www.apple-iphone-unlocking.com/
history—and—development.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
337. Fred Vogelstein, The Untold Story: How the iPhone Blew Up the Wireless Industry,
16 WIRED (Jan. 9, 2008), available at http://www.wired.com/gadgets/wireless/magazine/1602/ff_iphone.
338. LinuxWorld, Connecting Firms and Peer Production, (Mar. 24, 2007), http://www.
linuxworld.com/community/?q=node/433 (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
339. ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 287, at § 4.3.
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Kaleidescape and RealNetworks, the requirement imposed by the DVD
CCA under the CSS license agreement to have a physical copy of a DVD
present in a device in order to play back the stored content of a DVD was
considered justified in order to protect the DVD CCA members’ copyrights and under the DRM/DMCA regime. Moreover, since the subject
matter of the CSS license is a software product, courts might follow the
Court of Appeals’ ruling in Microsoft340 and carve an additional exemption from illegal analysis per se.
Furthermore, since firms such as Sony, Apple, Microsoft, and Creative341 have the facilities and incentives to engage in R&D efforts for the
development of a substitute to the Kaleidescape system and RealDVD,
the second prong of the safety zone is also fulfilled. Thus, in such circumstances, the safety zone will not prevent the foreclosure of the IT
market to new entrepreneurs such as Kaleidescape.
4. Hearing on Antitrust Enforcement in IT markets
As part of the agencies’ efforts to adapt the antitrust enforcement
standards to the rapid pace of technology, the agencies held hearings
during 2006-2007 to discuss the enforcement of antitrust laws and intellectual property rights. A summary of the hearings and their conclusions was published in the agencies’ report on innovation and
competition.342 As in the licensing guidelines, the hearings report also
instructed the agencies to consider the effect a license restraint may
have on innovation, to apply flexible framework and to evaluate whether
the license damages “competition among entities that would have been
actual or likely potential competitors in a relevant market in the absence
of a license.”343
The hearings report, however, does not provide any new or different
insights with respect to the manner in which antitrust law should be
enforced in IT markets. The theme set forth in the licensing guidelines
remained the same: the application of antitrust law in IT markets is similar to the application of the law in traditional markets.344 As I shall
further explore in the following subsection, the application of antitrust
laws by the courts also did not offer a different way to enforce antitrust
laws in IT markets.
340. See the discussion in Section V.C.1.ii.a., infra.
341. I chose these firms because all of them have already developed and marketed a
similar portable device that can store and play back audio and video content.
342. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, supra note 288.
343. ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 287, at § VI.
344. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, supra note 288; ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 287,
at § 3.1.
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C. INNOVATION MARKET RELATED CONSIDERATION: LESSONS FROM
COURTS’ APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAW IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RELATED LITIGATIONS

THE

1. Microsoft
i.

Defining the Relevant Market

Innovation related considerations and the dynamic characters of
competition in IT markets were explicitly mentioned by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in United States v.
Microsoft.345 On appeal, Microsoft argued that it operates in a dynamic
technology market that is characterized by a network effect.346 According to Microsoft’s argument, the competition in a technology dynamic
market that is characterized by a strong network effect is for the market
and not in the market. Thus, “once a product or a standard achieves
wide acceptance, it becomes more or less entrenched.”347 However, because technology is a dynamic market, the entrenchment of one product
is only temporary. A new innovation may change the whole market at
once. Thus, even a monopolist firm continues to invest in R&D seeking
further innovative products in order to preserve its position in the market.348 In light of these characteristics, Microsoft urged the court to use
different measures and tests when applying antitrust laws.349
The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed Microsoft’s claim for a different application of antitrust laws with respect to a firm’s behavior in
dynamic technology markets, explaining that competition in the short
run needs to be addressed. As the court stated:
As an initial matter, we note that there is no consensus among commentators on the question of whether, and to what extent, current monopolization doctrine should be amended to account for competition in
technologically dynamic markets characterized by network effects . . .
Indeed, there is some suggestion that the economic consequences of network effects and technological dynamism act to offset one another,
thereby making it difficult to formulate categorical antitrust rules absent a particularized analysis of a given market.350

However, the court held that “Microsoft’s argument fails because,
even assuming that the software market is uniquely dynamic in the long
term, the District Court correctly applied the structural approach to de345. Microsoft III, 253 F. 3d 34.
346. Id. at 49.
347. Id.
348. Id. “In technology dynamic markets, however, such entrenchment may be temporary, because innovations may alter the field altogether.” Id.
349. Id.
350. Microsoft III, 253 F. 3d at 50.
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termine if the company faces competition in the short term.”351 The
Court of Appeals chose to stick to the structural approach for defining
the relevant market and determining the existence of market power.
Similar to the test used for defining the market in the licensing guidelines, the scope of the relevant market under the structural approach is
determined according to the Small but Significant and Non-transitory
Increase in Price (“SSNIP”) test. According to this test, the relevant
market includes all goods or technologies that will be considered by the
consumers as substitutes to the allegedly monopolized goods or technology in case the alleged monopolist will raise the price of its goods or technology by a small but significant and non-transitory increase.352
The Court of Appeals approved the District Court’s conclusion that
according to the SSNIP test, the relevant market in which Microsoft has
a monopoly power is the market of Intel-compatible PC operating systems. The court concluded that handheld devices and portal websites
are not substitutes in the consumer’s opinion.353
As discussed in Section V.B.2.i.b. supra, by adhering to the SSNIP
test for defining the relevant market, the court ignored the special characteristics of IT markets. In IT markets, the relevant market includes
not only the obvious current technologies (in Microsoft, the Intel-compatible PC operating systems), but the relevant market may include new
technologies, existing products, and developing products that are not yet
in the market. Furthermore, new and in-development technologies cannot be considered, in most cases, as substitutable, because there is no
common base for comparing such goods.354
The operating system market serves as a good example for the problematic use of the SSNIP test in IT markets. In 2001, the D.C circuit
court in Microsoft rejected Microsoft’s request to include handheld devices and portal websites in the relevant market for operating systems.
However, in 2009, as Net Application’s market share chart shows, mobile
phones, like the iPhone, and game platforms, like Playstation 3, have
shares (although minimal) in the operating system market.355 Furthermore, as noted before, Microsoft’s major rival these days is Google, and
351. Id. at 56.
352. ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 287 at § 3.2.1-2.
353. Microsoft III, 253 F. 3d at 56.
354. GLADER, supra note 18, at 67.
355. Net Application, Operating System Market Share (Feb. 2010), http://marketshare.
hitslink.com/report.aspx?qprid=8&qpmr=100&qpdt=1&qpct=0&qpcal=1&qpcal=1&qptime
frame=M&qpsp=133 (last visited Feb. 24, 2010). According to this chart, Microsoft has a
92.12% share in the operating systems market, Mac has 5.02%, Linux 0.98%, mobile devices (iPhone, Symbian, Java ME, iPod Touch, Windows Mobile, Android, Blackberry,
Palm) 1.63%, and Game consoles (Playstation, Nintendo Wii) have less than 1 percent. Id.
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Google is aiming to develop a web based platform that can serve as an
alternative to operating system software.
ii. Identifying Anticompetitive Behavior
a.

Tying Arrangement

The Court of Appeals further ruled that Microsoft’s bundling of its
Internet browser, Internet Explorer, with a Microsoft operating system,
Windows, by integrating the browser into the operating system, was a
violation of Section Two of the Sherman Act.356 The court performed a
rule of reason analysis, considering first whether such bundling was anticompetitive and after concluding it had an anticompetitive effect, the
court examined whether there were any justifications for such
integration.
During the rule of reason analysis, the court acknowledged the dynamic characteristics of competition in IT markets and the rapid phase
of innovation as a firm’s common practice that should not be condemned:
In a competitive market, firms routinely innovate in the hope of appealing to consumers, sometimes in the process making their products incompatible with those of rivals; the imposition of liability when a
monopolist does the same thing will inevitably deter a certain amount
of innovation. This is all the more true in a market, such as this one, in
which the product itself is rapidly changing.357

Furthermore, in light of the dynamic characteristic of competition in
IT markets, the Court of Appeals carved an exception to the antitrust
rule.358 Usually, a tying arrangement is considered illegal per se when
the following conditions are met: “(1) the tying and tied goods are two
separate products; (2) the defendant has market power in the tying product market; (3) the defendant affords consumers no choice but to
purchase the tied product from it; and (4) the tying arrangement forecloses a substantial volume of commerce.”359
While applying the first test for a per se illegal tying arrangement,
the court inquired whether Internet Explorer and the Windows operating system were separate products. The Supreme Court defined the separate product test in Jefferson Parish v. Hyde.360 The test is derived
from the consumer’s demand for the two products.361 The court applied
the direct consumer demand test to determine whether historically there
was a separate demand for the tied and tying product.362
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.

Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 95.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 94-95.
Id. at 85.
Parish v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
Id. at 86-87.
Id.
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Microsoft argued that applying a consumer demand test to measure
whether the two products included in a tying arrangement are separate
would chill innovation. Microsoft further contended that developers
would refrain from integrating new features into their technology because they would fear that consumers would consider the integrated innovative feature as a separate product. According to the consumer
demand test, consumers perceive the innovative feature and the technology as separate products because consumers are not familiar with such
innovative features. Therefore, the courts would find that the integration of the two products was a per se illegal tying arrangement.363
The Court of Appeals accepted Microsoft’s argument and held that
the direct consumer demand test for separate products may impose serious obstacles on new and innovative technologies in the software market
because that particular market “serves as a platform for third party applications.”364 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that applying a
per se rule to tying arrangements in the software market “creates undue
risks of error and of deterring welfare-enhancing innovation.”365
A tying arrangement, which constitutes a “technological integration
of added functionality into software that serves as a platform for thirdparty applications,” reflects new circumstances with “no close parallel in
prior antitrust cases.”366 The Court of Appeals concluded that in such
new circumstances, “simplistic application of per se tying rules carries a
serious risk of harm.”367
By crafting this exemption, the court considered the main feature of
competition in IT markets – its dynamic characteristic – and addressed it
in the application of antitrust enforcement tests.368 However, the exemption that the Court of Appeals formulated is rather narrow and technology-specific. The exemption is limited to an integrated software
application to software that has similar functionality as an operating
363. For a broader discussion on the incentives paradigm and its adequacy to the information age, see Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives
Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75 (2004); Elissa D. Hecker, Understand and Respect the
Copyright Law: Keep the Incentive to Create, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 741 (2003); Stan
Liebowitz, Back to the Future: Can Copyright Owners Appropriate Revenues in the Face of
New Copying Technologies, in THE ECONOMIC OF COPYRIGHT: DEVELOPMENT IN RESEARCH
AND ANALYSIS (Wendy J. Gordon & Richard Watt eds., 2003). As noted before, many times
information goods are produced in nonmarket based ways by individuals that operate out
of intrinsic motivation independent from financial incentives or reward. See discussion in
Section III.B supra.
364. Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 84.
365. Id. at 89-90.
366. Id. at 84.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 92-95.
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system.369 In addition, the exemption does not seem to introduce a new
way of thinking or different standards for enforcing the antitrust
laws.370 Rather, the exemption suits the antitrust licensing guidelines,
which instruct the agencies to use the rule of reason analysis, unless the
license restriction is plainly anticompetitive.371 Therefore, although the
court in Microsoft crafted an exemption that reveals the court’s awareness and attentiveness to the dynamic characteristics of competition in
IT markets, practitioners and commentators should not overrate the exemption’s importance. The court maintained the tests and rules discussed above with respect to antitrust enforcement “as is,” and did not
pay attention to the need for a change in antitrust enforcement considerations with respect to IT markets.
b.

Predatory Pricing

Microsoft also offered its browser and browser access kit for free to
Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”), like AOL, in addition to a bounty for
each ISP’s customer who registered to the service via Internet Explorer.372 By doing so, Microsoft imposed further barriers to the entry of
possible new browsers or operating systems technologies. However, the
Court of Appeals chose to focus on the Internet Explorer price.373 The
court examined whether Microsoft is liable for predatory pricing.374
Under antitrust law, a court may condemn a predator if it “drive[s] out
its rivals by pricing below cost on a particular product and then, sometime in the future, raise[s] its prices on that product above the competitive level in order to recoup its earlier losses.”375 The court concluded
that Microsoft did not violate the antitrust laws by offering its Internet
Explorer free of charge.376 The court further noted “the antitrust laws
do not condemn even a monopolist for offering its product at an attractive price.”377
This ruling emphasizes the error in the current application of antitrust laws to dynamic technology markets. The price of a product is indeed important from a consumer’s point of view. The rational choice
theory also encourages antitrust law’s focus on a product’s price as the
369. Id. at 95.
370. Kara E. Harchuck, Microsoft IV: The Dangers to Innovation Posed by the Irresponsible Application of a Rule of Reason Analysis to Product Design Claims, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
395, 437 (2002).
371. ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 287 § 5.3.
372. Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 68.
373. Id. at 68-69.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 68.
376. Id.
377. Id.
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main factor for antitrust enforcement.378 However, in IT markets, the
product’s price is not the only relevant consideration for consumers.379
Consumers also evaluate the innovative features of information
goods.380 Moreover, in IT markets, the price is only important from a
short-term perspective. From a long-term perspective, the more important matter that the court should have addressed was the effect that
Microsoft’s practice of distributing its browser for free in addition to a
bounty had on future innovation due to the dynamic characteristic of the
technology market.
2. Illinois Tool Works v. Indep. Ink
In Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink, the Supreme Court continued the Microsoft line of analysis in its awareness of the dynamic characteristic of competition in IT markets, but at the same time declined to
make substantial changes to antitrust enforcement standards.381 Furthermore, neither court examined whether to amend antitrust law enforcement in light of the significant role of nonmarket based information
production models in IT markets.
In Illinois Tool Works, the Supreme Court rebutted the market
power presumption with regard to products covered by intellectual property rights.382 Illinois Tool required that purchasers of its patented
printing system refill the system only with Illinois Tool’s unpatented ink.
The Court stated that Congress amended the Patent Code in 1988, and
by doing so, Congress eliminated the market power presumption in the
patent misuse context.383 Section 271(d)(5) of the Patent Act states that
one of the conditions for patent misuse is the existence of market power
in the relevant market for the tying patent or patented product.384
Therefore, based on Section 271(d)(5) of the Patent Act, the Court held
that it would be anomalous to preserve the presumption within antitrust
law in the absence of a market power presumption in the patent misuse
378. Sidak & Teece, supra note 119, at 612-13.
379. Id.
380. Pleatsikas & Teece, supra note 16, at 111; Evans, supra note 16, at 258-59; Sidak &
Teece, supra note 119, at 602.
381. Illinois Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 38-46.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2009) states:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following: 5) conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the
patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or
purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent
owner has market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product
on which the license or sale is conditioned. Id.
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doctrine.385 The Court rebutted the market power presumption and concluded that tying arrangements involving patented products should be
evaluated under the rule of reason analysis rather than under the per se
rule.386 In its ruling, however, the Court did not explicitly discuss the
unique features of IT markets as being the reason for rebutting the market power presumption.387
3. RealNetworks v. DVD CCA
RealNetworks filed a lawsuit against the DVD CCA and several major movie studios in the District Court of the Northern District of California.388 In its lawsuit, RealNetworks argued that the CSS license
agreement, which is the studios’ collective agreement not to license a
technology that would allow the copying of CSS-encrypted technology,
should be considered as anticompetitive behavior that led to an ongoing
delay in marketing RealDVD.389 This delay in marketing RealDVD
caused RealNetworks a serious antitrust injury.390
The court dismissed RealNetworks’ claims on the grounds that the
CSS license would be considered an illegal agreement only if the relevant
market for antitrust analysis would be limited to the market of technologies that copy content from CSS-encrypted disks.391 In such a narrow
market, an agreement among all movie studios not to license a technology that would allow the copying of CSS-encrypted technology, while the
studios use only their own technology for distributing their copyrighted
content, should be considered anticompetitive.392
The court determined, however, that the relevant market is much
broader.393 The relevant market, even under RealNetworks’ own argument, is the market for technologies that allows consumer to obtain and
manage digital copies of copyrighted content that are not necessarily
CSS protected.394 Furthermore, individual studios are not prevented
from distributing their copyrighted content on non-CSS protected DVDs.
On the contrary, Apple and Amazon even reached agreements with certain movie studios for distributing copyrighted content on their own services. The allegedly illegal collective agreement only prohibits
RealNetworks and its consumers from accessing an encrypted technol385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

Illinois Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 39-43.
Id.
Id
RealNetworks, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
RealNetworks, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
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ogy. The agreement does not impose any obstacles on RealNetworks’
ability to reach an agreement for licensing the studios’ copyrighted content, in the form of non-CSS encrypted digital copies, in the relevant
market, i.e., the market for technologies that allows consumers to obtain
and manage digital copies of copyrighted content.395 Furthermore, the
agreement did not limit the movie studios’ ability to distribute their
copyrighted content on CSS-encrypted DVDs exclusively. Thus, the CSS
license could not plausibly be an illegal restraint of trade.396
Furthermore, the court held that even if RealNetworks had the right
to circumvent the CSS technology, RealNetworks still violated the
DMCA.397 RealNetworks’ circumvention of the ARccOS or RipGuard,
the additional DRM measures employed by the movie studios, constituted a violation of the DMCA, which justified the injunctive relief.398
Therefore, RealNetwork’s alleged injury, the ongoing delay in marketing
RealDVD, was the result of RealNetworks’ own illegal behavior and was
not a plausible antitrust injury.399 Throughout its reasoning, however,
the court did not explain how it reached the definition of the market.
Nor did the court show any awareness of the fact that the relevant market is dynamic or that potential competitors may arise from nonmarket
based information production models.
D. SAME RULES, DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES
As apparent from the discussion above, courts and antitrust enforcement agencies are aware of the dynamic characteristic of competition in
IT markets. However, neither the courts nor the agencies addressed the
implication that the change in information production models may have
on antitrust enforcement in IT markets.400
Furthermore, antitrust law enforcement still does not appropriately
address the implications of the dynamic characteristic of competition in
IT markets. As explained above, the use of the same tests and rules for
the application of antitrust law, such as the SSNIP test for defining the
relevant market401 and the definition of relevant competitors402 mainly
perpetuated the focus of antitrust enforcement on a static model of competition referring to substitutable goods currently available in the market and the price of such goods.403 Thus, although innovation
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See the discussion in Section V.B and V.C supra.
See the discussion in Sections V.B.2.i.b and V.C.1.i.a supra.
See the discussion in Section V.B.2.i.c.1 supra.
Sidak & Teece, supra note 119, at 602.
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considerations were known to agencies and courts, they were not translated into an actual change in antitrust enforcement thinking. Moreover, antitrust enforcement does not devote any special attention to the
fact that the IT market is a data market, nor does it provide any resolution to the possible harms to consumers that are typical to data
markets.404
Posner and Landes contend that antitrust law concerns arise only in
limited circumstances in IT markets.405 According to Posner and
Landes, market forces are the best tools for securing efficient competition in the market in most cases. The combination of copyright law and
contracts can result in excessive market power, for example when a
software manufacturer uses a license agreement to restrict the rights of
the end user to use its software in a way that is far beyond the restriction
provided under copyright law.406 However, because of the network effect, such a combination does not damage competition.407
According to the explanation offered by Posner and Landes, when a
market is characterized by a network effect, the competition is for the
market and not within the market. It is a competition in the form of
“winner takes it all,” i.e., the desire of each competitor is to gain a monopoly position and benefit from the network effect.408 Thus, the more
protection from competition the winning firm enjoys, the more competition there will be in order to become the monopolist.409 Assuming that
the permitted means for obtaining a monopoly are socially productive,
the competition for the monopoly position will be desirable.410 The competition for becoming the monopoly will accelerate the rate of innovation,
since each firm will attempt to be the first to provide the public with the
next new and attractive technology.411 Moreover, according to Posner
and Landes, the winner – the monopoly firm – will initially charge a very
low price for its new product in order to gain more users and enjoy a
network effect in the market.412
According to Posner and Landes, antitrust laws should only justifiably intervene when the barriers preventing the entry into a network
market are set.413 However, even in such limited circumstances, Posner
404. Harbour & Koslov, supra note 122.
405. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 60, at 390-02.
406. Id. at 394.
407. Id. at 394-55.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. A similar argument was raised by Microsoft as a justification for changing antitrust enforcement tests.
412. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 60, at 394-66.
413. See Id. at 397-00.
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and Landes, like the courts and the agencies, are of the opinion that current antitrust rules are sufficient.414 Posner and Landes explain that
antitrust concerns with respect to barriers preventing the entry into a
network market are not a new phenomenon.415 They existed well before
the proliferation of IT markets; hence, it is already an adequate solution
under antitrust law.416
The treatment provided for the entry barriers by the Supreme Court
in 1922 in the Standard Fashion417 case is suitable, according to Posner
and Landes, to an increase in the entry barriers in IT markets as well.418
Standard Fashion manufactured the most popular line of women’s dress
patterns.419 It required that any retailer who wanted to have Standard
Fashion dress patterns in its store must refrain from holding competing
lines.420 Because consumers preferred to enter stores that had the full
line of women’s dress patterns, Standard Fashion enjoyed a network effect at the distribution level. Retailers who wanted to have prosperous
businesses had to present the full line of the most popular women’s dress
patterns in their stores, i.e., the Standard Fashion line, and to abstain
from giving any space to competing lines.421 In theory, manufacturers of
competing lines could have opened retail stores for their own lines; however, most of the consumers probably would not have entered their
stores, since they would have lacked the most popular dress patterns.422
In IT markets, the situation, according to Posner and Landes, is
quite similar.423 In both Standard Fashion and in IT markets, copyright
or other intellectual property law protects the goods at issue.424 A firm
may wish to enter the market by producing one component of the network, but if a competitor who has an exclusive dealing contract with the
network refuses to cooperate with the firm, it will have to create the entire network from scratch in order to distribute its product.425 The development phase of the distribution network in IT markets is in a similar
stage as the distribution network discussed in Standard Fashion.426
The distribution facilities may be sufficiently limited to create bottle414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.

Id. 402.
Id. at 396-02.
Id. at 397-00.
Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1992).
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 60, at 397-00.
Id. at 397.
Id.
Standard Fashion, 258 U.S. 346.
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 60, at 397-00.
Id. at 397-89.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 397.
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necks that the monopolist can exploit to perpetuate the monopoly.427
The Internet, however, may eliminate many distribution bottlenecks.428
Exclusionary conduct via contracts, as the one demonstrated in
Standard Fashion and as is common in IT markets, has, as argued by
Posner and Landes, efficiency justification.429 It may encourage the retailer to invest more in presenting and serving the customers with respect to the manufacturer’s brand.430 Posner and Landes acknowledged
that a full analysis of the costs and benefits of exclusionary dealing
might be beyond the courts’ ability.431 Thus, they offered a test for determining whether the courts should condemn a certain practice of exclusive dealing.432 According to their proposed test, if the practice is widely
employed in industries that resemble the industry where the monopoly
firm operates, but the resembling industries are competitive, the presumption should be that the monopolist is entitled to use it as well.433
Facing such a burden, the plaintiff will have to show that prohibiting the
use of that practice will offset the effect of the prohibition on the monopolist’s costs by increasing the rate or speed of new entry.434
Considering that exclusive dealing and tying arrangements are analytically similar, Posner and Landes proposed to apply the same solution
to both practices.435 Posner and Landes concluded that the antitrust
doctrine is sufficient to effectively deal with the antitrust matters in IT
markets.436 But the trouble is in the institutional structure of antitrust
enforcement in the United States.437
However, Posner and Landes’ position has several shortcomings.
First, the presumption that the market forces can provide the adequate
solution for securing efficient competition in the IT market is not clear of
doubts.438 This presumption might have been correct in IT markets
before the enactment of the DMCA and the ramifications of the DRM/
DMCA regime. The DRM/DMCA regime, however, allows the monopoly
firm to increase the entry barriers into the market by imposing technological locks and relying upon the anti-circumvention prohibition of the
DMCA. Hence, the monopoly firm is capable of extending its monopoly.
Competition for the market, in the form of the “winner takes it all,” is
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.

Id.
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 60, at 397.
Id. at 397-89.
Id.
Id. at 399.
Id.
Id.
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 60, at 397.
Id. at 400.
Id. at 402.
Id.
Sidak & Teece, supra note 119, at 586-91.
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therefore prevented.439 One of the prominent examples of using the
DRM/DMCA regime as a tool for increasing the entry barriers into the
market is Apple’s use of its DRM software, FairPlay.440 FairPlay was
the DRM measure included in any audio and video file bought and
downloaded from Apple’s online music store, iTunes.441 Before removing
the anti-copying restrictions imposed by Fairplay and removing the
DRM,442 Apple was said to use Fairplay as a tool for limiting iPod customers to iTunes software and the iTunes online store. Thus, stifling
competition and blocking competitors in the market for digital music.443
Fearing the effect of Apple’s monopoly in the digital music market on its
bargaining power, Universal, one of the major music labels in the United
States, sacrificed its copyrights and released its songs DRM-free with
other online music stores attempting to enhance competition in the legal
digital music download market.444
By ignoring possible anticompetitive exploitation of the DRM/DMCA
regime, Posner and Landes did not examine the use of antitrust law for
regulating other types of behaviors beside exclusionary conduct.445
Thus, Posner and Landes did not face the difficulties involved in applying the SSNIP test for defining the relevant market, the test for defining
market power and for revealing possible competitors.446 Nor did Posner
and Landes face the shortcomings of these tests in IT markets where the
price of the good is not the main indicator for efficient competition.447
Moreover, IT markets consist of goods produced in market and
nonmarket based ways, as well as goods in development that are not yet
in the market, are not comparable and therefore cannot be considered as
substitutable.448
439. BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y AT HARV. L. SCH., ITUNES: HOW COPYRIGHT,
CONTRACT, AND TECHNOLOGY SHAPE THE BUSINESS OF DIGITAL MEDIA – A CASE STUDY 40-50
(2004), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/media/uploads/81/iTunesWhitePaper06
04.pdf [hereinafter ITUNES CASE STUDY].
440. Devin Pastoor, Apple Blocking iTunes Competition for iPod?, HOTHARDWARE (Dec.
5, 2008) http://hothardware.com/News/Apple-Blocking-iTunes-Competition-for-iPhone/
(last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
441. Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Music (Feb. 6, 2007) http://www.apple.com/hotnews/
thoughtsonmusic/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
442. As of January 2009, Apple offers for sale via its iTunes store songs free of DRM
protection. Apple Press Release, supra note 15. Apple’s DRM, Fairplay, is still employed
on movies and television shows. Id.
443. Pastoor, supra note 442.
444. Posting of Jack Schofield, Universal Plans DRF-free Downloads, without Apple,
THE GUARDIAN TECHNOLOGY BLOG (Aug. 10, 2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/
blog/2007/aug/10/universalplans (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
445. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 60, at 399.
446. Id.
447. Sidak & Teece, supra note 119, at 600-66.
448. Id. at 614-66.
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Moreover, the Posner and Landes test, with respect to antitrust enforcement in the case of exclusionary conduct, is based upon comparing
the exclusionary conduct at issue with similar behaviors in other competitive markets.449 According to that test, it is necessary to examine
whether the same practice at issue is widely used in industries that resemble the monopolist’s but are competitive.450 Posner and Landes did
not specify what they meant by referring to industries that resemble the
monopolist’s.451 They did not focus the analysis on certain markets or
list certain conditions that are required to perform such analysis. As a
result, the comparison may be applied to any other market, whether it is
an IT market or a traditional goods market.452
For example, the U.S. pet food market resembles the women’s clothing market discussed in Standard Fashion.453 In both cases, it is necessary to establish a distribution network for distributing the goods. Also,
in both cases, intellectual property rights protect the goods involved. A
design patent or copyright may protect women’s clothing and a trade secret or patent may protect the formula for producing a nutritious pet
food. Because the pet food market resembles the market for women’s
clothing in Standard Fashion, following Posner and Landes’ argument,
the pet food market should resemble the IT market as well. The pet food
market in the United States is quite competitive;454 hence, according to
the test that Posner and Landes offered, the pet food market can be used
as an objective comparable to behaviors in IT markets. However, it
seems farfetched to infer the appropriate enforcement of antitrust law in
IT markets from behaviors in the pet food market that are not as dynamic as a typical IT market.
E. SUMMARY
IT markets present a challenge for antitrust enforcement.455 It includes different circumstances and market features than those of tradi449. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 60, at 399.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Standard Fashion, 258 U.S. 346.
454. According to a study conducted in July 2004, the Nestle Purina PetCare Company
has 30% of the pet food market share in the U.S., The Lams Company (P&G) and Hill’s Pet
Nutrition has 12% each, Mars Inc. has 11%, Ol’Roy (Wal-Mart) has 10%; Del Monte Foods
has 7%, Nutro Products, Inc. has 4%, and other firms hold together 14% of the market
share. See Nora Ganim Barnes, A Market Analysis of the U.S. Pet Food Industry to Determine New Opportunities for the Cranberry Industry, CENTER FOR BUSINESS RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS DARTMOUTH 8 (2005), http://www.uts.edu.au/fac/hss/public_
communication/student_work/cranberry_ad.pdf.
455. See Pleatsikas & Teece, supra note 16; Evans, supra note 16; Sidak & Teece, supra
note 119.
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tional markets.456
In order to correctly apply antitrust law to IT markets, it is necessary to identify the innovating firms and products under development, to
consider the information goods that might be produced in nonmarket
based ways, to assess the conditions for innovation in the specific field,
and to identify common harms to consumers in a data market, such as
harm to consumers’ privacy rights.457 In addition, IT market regulation
needs to take into account the different level of efficient competition adequate to each level of the IT market.458 The level of efficient competition
may differ according to the level of development of the relevant inventions and the stage of the innovative process.459 When analyzing actual
and potential competition in existing markets, the antitrust enforcement
should consider innovation considerations when defining and evaluating
the relevant product market.460 When analyzing actual and potential
competition in a market that is highly likely to include products in development, the antitrust enforcement should examine the R&D efforts
market.461
Current antitrust enforcement, however, does not seem to provide
the adequate tools for conducting the appropriate analysis in IT markets.462 The main notion in the agencies’ guidelines, court rulings, and
some scholarly writings rejects applying different antitrust tests and enforcement standards and advocates for applying the known and familiar
antitrust tests.463 Such notions, therefore, fix antitrust enforcement to
the traditional goods and markets world, and ignore the differences between traditional markets and IT markets. Examining how, if at all, antitrust enforcement should change its tests in order to regulate the
anticompetitive effect of the DRM/DMCA regime in IT markets is beyond
the scope of this article.
VI. CAN COPYRIGHT LAW PROVIDE THE
SUITABLE SOLUTION?
In several instances involving what seems to be anticompetitive behaviors in IT markets, including during the DRM/DMCA regime, courts
and scholars have expressed the opinion that copyright law, through existing copyright doctrines, can provide the efficient and adequate solu456. See Pleatsikas & Teece, supra note 16; Evans, supra note 16; Sidak & Teece, supra
note 119.
457. GLADER, supra note 18, at 189-24.
458. Katz, supra note 137.
459. Id.
460. GLADER, supra note 18, at 189.
461. Id.
462. See discussion in Section V.B-D supra.
463. See discussion in Section V.B-D supra; Sidak & Teece, supra note 119, at 610-30.
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tion and that antitrust intervention is not necessary.464 Posner and
Landes, for example, contended that in many cases, antitrust law intervention is not necessary since copyright law can provide the adequate
solution alone.465 For example, in Lotus v. Borland,466 Lotus argued
that Borland International, Inc. infringed its computer spreadsheet program, Lotus 1-2-3, when Borland copied the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command
hierarchy into its Quattro and Quattro Pro computer spreadsheet programs.467 The court held that the Lotus menu command hierarchy,
which provides the means by which users control and operate Lotus 1-23, is not a copyrightable expression, and hence dismissed Lotus’ infringement suit.468 Judge Boudin noted in his concurring opinion the risks
concealed in excessive copyright protection stating:
Requests for the protection of computer menus present the concern with
fencing off access to the commons in an acute form. . . If Lotus is
granted a monopoly on this pattern, users who have learned the command structure of Lotus 1-2-3 or devised their own macros are locked
into Lotus. . . Lotus has already reaped a substantial reward for being
first; assuming that the Borland program is now better, good reasons
exist for freeing it to attract old Lotus customers: to enable the old customers to take advantage of a new advance, and to reward Borland in
turn for making a better product.469

In this Section, I will examine the option to regulate anticompetitive
behaviors under the DRM/DMCA regime by enforcing copyright law
rather than antitrust law. To accomplish this aim, I will start by exploring the theoretical reasoning of the copyright law in the United States. I
will then explore the Courts’ ruling in two cases involving anticompetitive use of the DRM/DMCA regime: Lexmark and Chamberlain and examine how existing copyright law doctrines were used to regulate such
behaviors.
A. THEORETICAL

AND

ECONOMIC REASONING
IN THE U.S.

OF

COPYRIGHT LAW

In 1787, at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, the framers of the Constitution adopted as one of the Constitution’s clauses,
“[t]he Congress shall have power. . . to promote the progress of science
and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors,
464. See, Landes & Posner, supra note 60 at 391-92; and the discussion in Section VI.B
supra.
465. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 60, at 391-92.
466. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d, 516 U.S.
233 (1996).
467. Id.
468. Id
469. Id.
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the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”470 The
language of this clause contained an important novel element, known as
the “idea of progress,” the concept of the promotion of progress as the
goal of Congress’ power under this clause.471
Scholars and courts interpreted the term “progress” in the Patent
Clause as referring to the word “science” with respect to copyright law,
and to “useful art,” with respect to patent law, implying the utility character of any patented invention. At the time the Constitution was formulated, the word “science” had a much broader meaning than just natural
science, like medicine and chemistry. Back then, the world of “science”
encompassed knowledge and learning. Thus, the goal of the Patent
Clause was to bestow Congress with the power to promote the progress
of knowledge.472
The Patent Clause was also considered to reflect the tradeoff between access to a protected work and incentives for further creation of
protected goods. The economic reasoning of access versus incentives
tradeoff is the utilitarian model473 that will be discussed in the next
paragraph.
1. Utilitarian Approach and Economic Analysis of Copyright Law in
the U.S.
A property right, according to the utilitarian model, confers two
types of economic benefits. The first type of benefit, static benefit, is illustrated by the benefits from a natural pasture. The property right in a
natural pasture allows its owner to exclude others from using its pasture
and therefore prevents others from overgrazing its pasture. In intellectual property, the static benefit is illustrated by the public domain, i.e.,
any invention, idea, and expression that is not patented, copyrighted, or
propertied in any other way.474
The second type of benefit is the dynamic benefit. The dynamic benefit of the property right is reflected in the incentive that the possession
of a property right bestows to further create and improve a resource in a
certain period, assuming that no one else can appropriate and enjoy the
same resource in a certain period of time in the future. An example is
the incentive a farmer has to plant a crop assuming that no one besides
him may appropriate the field at harvest time. In the intellectual property world, the dynamic benefit is reflected in a firm’s likely willingness
470. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
471. Michael D. Birnhack, The Idea of Progress in Copyright Law, 1 BUFFALO INTELL.
PROP. L. J. 3, 35-38 (2001).
472. Id. at 33-37.
473. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 60.
474. Id. at 12-14.
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to invest in developing a new product, knowing its competitors will not
be able to duplicate such product and market it without bearing the development costs.475
However, because intellectual property is a public good, such features of public good, the inability to block free riding and to stop free
distribution of information goods, impair the dynamic benefit of property
rights. The non-excludability and non-rivalry features weaken the likelihood to recapture the investment involved in the creation of intellectual
property goods. Competitors who did not bear any of the cost associated
with the creation of the intellectual property goods can easily, and at a
much lower cost, copy and distribute the copied intellectual property
goods. Without appropriate legal protection against copying, the incentives to create intellectual property goods will be demolished.476 The appropriate legal protection of intellectual property must, however,
correctly and appropriately balance the costs and benefits associated
with intellectual property rights, i.e., the access versus incentives
tradeoff.477
There are three types of costs associated with any property right,
including intellectual property rights. The first cost is the transaction
cost, the cost one has to bear while transferring his property right. According to Posner and Landes, transaction costs, with respect to intellectual property, are likely to be very high. Intellectual property goods lack
a noticeable physical form; hence, they are hard to identify. As a result,
the transaction costs for any transaction involving intellectual property
goods are rather high.478
Landes and Posner give an example of a painting that may be copied, and the copies may be sold as prints or affixed to other salable objects such as mugs. The original and the copies share the same work of
art that is a nonmaterial object separate from the painting itself. The
transaction costs associated with selling the original are unlikely to be
high. However, the transaction cost associated with transferring the interest in the painting is rather high. For example, the transaction cost
475. Id.
476. For a broader discussion on the incentives paradigm and its adequacy to the information age, see Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives
Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75 (2004); Elissa D. Hecker, Understand and Respect the
Copyright Law: Keep the Incentive to Create, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 741 (2003); Stan
Liebowitz Stan, Back to the Future: Can Copyright Owners Appropriate Revenues in the
Face of New Copying Technologies, in THE ECONOMIC OF COPYRIGHT: DEVELOPMENT IN RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS (Wendy J. Gordon & Richard Watt eds., 2003). As noted before,
many times information goods are produced in nonmarket based ways by individuals that
operate out of intrinsic motivation independent from financial incentives or reward. See
discussion in Section III.B. supra.
477. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 60, at 17-24.
478. Id.
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associated with transferring the right to copy the painting is fairly high,
since the exact definition of the work of art, what can be copied, and
what would be considered as infringing copy of the work of art, is difficult
to portray.479
The second type of cost associated with property rights arises from
the motive of rent seeking. Rent seeking is an economic term used to
describe the quest after what is called “rent” – the pure profit, i.e., the
return over and above the cost of generating such return. Here, again,
Landes and Posner contend that the rent seeking cost with respect to
intellectual property is fairly high, compared with those associated with
property rights. Because intellectual property goods are waiting to be
invented, created, or discovered, and the owner of a property right receives a monopoly, there is a race to be the first to discover, invent, or
create intellectual property goods. Such a race leads to high investment
in producing knowledge that will return only the competitive rate of return on average. The difference between the excess over the optimal
level of investment in producing knowledge and the social benefits resulting from additional investment is the cost, or some say the waste,
produced by rent seeking.480
The third type of cost associated with property rights is the cost of
protection. In real property, the costs of protection are, for example, the
costs of preventing and punishing trespassing and theft, which are incurred by the police, the property owner, and the courts enforcing the
law. The lack of physical form and boundaries of intellectual property
goods according to Landes and Posner again leads to a higher cost of
protection. Intellectual property goods cannot be seen like land, cannot
be traced like land, and the public good character of intellectual property
makes it hard to prevent its misappropriation and to exclude free riders,
and it is quite difficult to detect unauthorized uses.481
In addition to the three types of costs associated with every property
right, producing information goods involves additional costs: the cost of
expression and the cost of producing the actual copies of the information
good.482 The role of copyright law is to maximize the static and dynamic
benefits of property rights in light of these costs associated with every
intellectual property right and the costs associated only with the copyright. This balance is also described as a cost-benefit tradeoff, and with
respect to intellectual property, the access versus incentives tradeoff.483
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 60, at 37-41.
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The legal rule secures the incentives to create. Without legal protection, the market price of an expressive work would be eventually equal to
the marginal cost of copying. As a result, the author or the publisher
may not be able to recoup their cost of expression. In addition, since the
cost of expression is incurred before the author or publisher knows what
will be the demand for the work, the author or the publisher also may
not be able to recoup the cost associated with the uncertainty and risk of
failure borne by them. In the absence of the possibility to recoup the cost
of expression and of uncertainty, there will be low, if any, incentives to
create and future expressive works may not be produced.484
As part of the access versus incentives tradeoff, the copyright law
secures, on one hand, the scope of the exclusive rights granted to the
right holder, and on the other hand, the public access to a copyrighted
work. The copyright law secures public access to a protected information
good by defining the scope of exclusive rights granted to the right holder,
and by imposing certain limitations on the exploitation of these exclusive
rights. For example, the duration of a copyright is limited to the life of
the author plus seventy years following his death. In addition, the copyright law protects only the expression of an idea but not the idea
itself.485
It is important to keep in mind the need to maintain the balance
between access and incentives, since excessively strong legal protection
has its downsides as well. The need to secure access to a copyrighted
work is best explained by the two common metaphors used by several
commentators, such as Robert Merton,486 while examining intellectual
property in general.
The first metaphor is “On the Shoulders of Giants.” According to
this metaphor, today’s creators and authors are only shortsighted
dwarfs, standing on the shoulders of giants, creatures of the past who
were more farsighted. While standing on those creatures’ shoulders, the
dwarfs are able to see far more than they or the giants were able to see.
The idea is that present day creators and authors lean upon the knowledge generated by previous creators and authors.487 The second metaphor is the metaphor of building taken from the architecture world.
According to this metaphor, each author builds his expressive work
based on the works of previous authors.488
Posner and Landes gave several actual examples for the use authors
make with previous information goods. According to a study they con484. Id. at 17-24.
485. Id.
486. Birnhack, supra note 473, at 41 (citing ROBERT K. MERTON, ON
GIANTS: A SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT (1993)).
487. Id. at 41-45.
488. Id.
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ducted, Shakespeare borrowed most of the characters and even some actual language from existing works of history, biography, or drama. The
description of Cleopatra in Shakespeare’s Antony and Cleopatra was
merely editing the language of the North-Plutarch description. Romeo
and Juliet by Shakespeare would have even infringed, in Posner and
Landes’ opinion, the work of Arthur Brooke’s The Tragical History of
Romeus and Juliet published in 1562.489
In light of this “building” notion, Posner and Landes emphasized
that although some copyright protection is indeed necessary in order to
provide incentives for further creation, excessively strong copyright protection has its flaws as well. Too much protection can raise the cost of
expression for those builders and dwarfs who want to use previous information goods as a base for their creation. As a result, future information
goods will not be created since the authors or publishers will not be able
to recoup their fixed cost of expression even under a strong copyright
protection. The optimal level of protection should therefore balance, according to Posner and Landes, between incentives and cost of
expression.490
The perception of copyright law as balancing creators’ incentives
and public access seems to adequately address the considerations associated with the dynamic character of competition in IT markets. The outcome of defining a limited and known scope of exclusive rights in the
hands of the right holders and securing limited scope of public access to a
copyrighted work would be obtaining sufficient incentives for further creation using the copyrighted works. Thus, an efficient level of innovation
is reached and dynamic efficiency is obtained.
In practice, however, this perception of balancing copyright law is
not clear of doubts. The expansion of copyright law in recent years has
led to strengthening of the right holder’s monopoly and shook the delicate tradeoff between incentives and public access.491 Discussing the
implications of the expansion of copyright law on its ability and fitting as
a regulating tool for anticompetitive behavior in IT markets is, however,
beyond the scope of this article.
In addition, new writings in recent years by Posner and Landes criticize this perception of IP law as a tradeoff between incentives and access,
i.e., between the incentives of the individual authors to further create
and the right of the general public to access the created works. In their
opinion, this perception oversimplifies the economic analysis of intellectual property law since it only focuses on the dynamic benefit of a prop489. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 60, at 66-68.
490. Id. at 73-57.
491. Bruce Abramson, Intellectual Property and the Alleged Collapsing of Aftermarkets,
38 RUTGERS. L.J. 399, 436-52 (2007).
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erty right, which is the incentives that the possession of a property right
conveys in the hand of its owner, and completely ignores the static benefit of a property right, which is the ability to exclude others from using
your property and hence the capability to prevent overusing the
property.
Posner and Landes resent, therefore, the characterization of information goods as non-rivalry.492 In their opinion, information goods can
be overused; for example, the use of the same trademark too many times
may result in blurring the uniqueness of the trademark. For example, if
the McDonalds trademark is used to describe all types of food, toys, and
other goods, not only by McDonalds itself, it will lose its value and
uniqueness.493
Accepting Posner and Landes’ argument would result in broadening
the scope of exclusive rights granted to the right holder and hence
strengthen the monopoly right in the hands of the right holder. Such
implications also relate to the expansion of the copyright law in recent
years and may shake the foundation of copyright law as the adequate
regulation measure for anticompetitive behavior in innovation markets.
Further discussion on the overgrazing argument and its implications on
IT markets is beyond the scope of this article.
Setting these problematic matters aside and assuming copyright law
sufficiently balances incentives and public access, hence, can serve as a
tool for obtaining dynamic efficiency in IT markets. I will now turn to
examine how existing copyright law doctrines were used to serve this
aim and adequately regulate anticompetitive behaviors that occurred
under the DRM/DMCA regime.
B. COPYRIGHT LAW IN ACTION: REGULATING ANTICOMPETITIVE
BEHAVIOR USING EXISTING DOCTRINES IN COPYRIGHT LAW
Anticompetitive use of the DRM/DMCA regime was discussed by
federal appellate courts in two of the cases already mentioned in this
paper, Lexmark and Chamberlain. Because the factual background was
already described in Section IV.C. and IV.D. supra, I will directly delve
into the examination of the application of copyright law doctrines in
these rulings.
492. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 60, at 12-14.
493. See Landes & Posner, supra note 125; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 60 at 11-36.
In their opinion, the public domain, which contains all the unprotected works or protected
works whose intellectual property right protection period ended, is similar to the natural
pasture in the tragedy of commons example. Id. Both will be overused absent a legal right
to exclude others from using it. Id. The way to solve the tragedy of commons with regards
to information goods, according to Landes and Posner, is by granting perpetual intellectual
property rights and eliminating the public domain. Id.
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1. Lexmark
The Court of Appeals in Lexmark began its discussion by identifying
the scope of copyright law under the Patent Clause and Section 102(a) of
the Copyright Act, which defines the types of works that may be protected under copyright law.494 The court continued to define the scope of
copyright protection by listing the exclusive rights granted under copyright law to a right holder to use her copyrighted work in certain ways as
detailed in the law.495 Those exclusive rights are the rights to reproduce
a copyrighted work, create derivative works based on the original copyrighted work, distribute copies of the copyrighted work, and publicly perform and display the copyrighted work.496
The court further emphasized that the scope of copyright protection
is fenced by several exemptions set forth in the copyright law.497 For
example, Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act sets forth the idea “expression dichotomy” by explicitly stating that copyright protection shall
never extend to any ideas or processes.498 Because it is difficult to identify and draw a line between idea and expression, the court describes two
“other staples of copyright law”499 that can be used to distinguish between an idea and an expression. The first test is known as the merger
doctrine. According to the merger doctrine, when the expression is vital
to the statement of the idea or where there is only one way or very few
ways of expressing the idea, the idea and expression are said to have
merged and copyright protection is not granted.
The second test mentioned by the court is the scènes à faire doctrine.
According to this doctrine, copyright protection shall not be granted to
elements that must be included in the work. With respect to software,
the elements of a program dictated by practical realities, such as the
hardware standards and mechanical specifications, software standards
494. 17 U.S.C § 102(a) states:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include
the following categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4)
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.
495. Lexmark II, 387 F.3d at 533-37.
496. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
497. Lexmark II, 387 F.3d at 537-38.
498. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) states “(b) [i]n no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.”
499. Lexmark II, 387 F.3d at 535.
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and compatibility requirements, are not entitled to copyright protection.500 The court further explained that with respect to the software
industry, the question under both doctrines “is not whether any alternatives theoretically exist; it is whether other options practically exist
under the circumstances. . . the alternatives must be feasible within realworld constraints.”501
By applying the merger doctrine and the scènes à faire doctrine, the
court concluded that “lockout” codes, i.e. the DRM employed, are a functional idea, rather than the original expression, because such lockout
codes are employed in order to prevent unauthorized use. Furthermore,
the code sequence is usually dictated by compatibility standards, because it must operate in conjunction with an unlock code that resides in
the applicable device. Hence, according to the court in Lexmark, both
under the merger doctrine and under the scènes à faire doctrine, lockout
codes are not entitled to copyright protection.502
An additional limitation on the scope of copyright protection is imposed under the fair use doctrine.503 The rational of the fair use doctrine, according to the court, is to provide a “defense to infringement
claims to ensure that copyright protection advances rather than thwarts
the essential purpose of copyright” under the Patent Clause in the U.S.
Constitution.504 With respect to the software industry, the fair use doctrine is a tool for securing public access to functional elements embodied
in a software application.505
While applying these standards and doctrines to the circumstances
in Lexmark, the court analyzed the operation of the Toner Loading Program that was infringed by SCC according to Lexmark’s argument. The
court concluded that the:
Toner Loading Program, recall, serves as input to the checksum operation that is performed each time the printer is powered on or the printer
door is opened and closed (i.e., for toner cartridge replacement). After
downloading a copy of the Toner Loading Program to calculate toner
levels, the Printer Engine Program runs a calculation—the checksum—
using every data byte of the Toner Loading Program as input. The program then compares the result of that calculation with a “checksum
value” that is located elsewhere on Lexmark’s toner cartridge chip.506
500. Id. at 538-39.
501. Id. at 537.
502. Id. at 536-73.
503. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
504. Lexmark II, 387 F.3d at 537.
505. Id. (citing Sony Computer Entm’t Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 603 (9th
Cir. 2000)).
506. Id. at 541.
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The printer will not function “if any single byte of the Toner Loading
Program is altered,” therefore, the court concluded that “pure compatibility requirements justified SCC’s copying of the Toner Loading
Program.”507
The court further noted that the Toner Loading Program operates as
a lockout code and is very brief. A brief program may be entitled to copyright protection if “a creative flair is shown.”508 In the absence of such
creative flair, “a very brief program is less likely to be copyrightable because it affords fewer opportunities for original expression.”509 With respect to the Toner Loading Program, no such creative flair was shown,
and under the merger doctrine and the scènes à faire doctrine the operation of the Toner Loading Program as a lockout code precludes it from
being entitled to copyright protection.510 Because the court concluded
that the Toner Loading Program is not copyrightable, it dismissed
Lexmark’s allegation for copyright infringement.511
On appeal, the court of appeals upheld the dismissal of Lexmark’s
claim for violation of the DMCA.512 Lexmark contended that Smartek
was a device that circumvents its authentication sequence (a type of
DRM), which should be considered as Lexmark’s technological protection
measure that effectively controlled the access to a copyrighted work – the
Printer Engine Program and the Toner Loading Program. Because the
Toner Loading Program is not a copyrightable work, however, the circumvention of the DRM controlling the access to it is not prohibited
under the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions.513
By excluding the Toner Loading Program from the scope of copyrightable work, the court annulled any influence the DRM/DMCA regime
might have. As a result, the court cut off the foundation of Lexmark’s
justifications for its anticompetitive behavior.
2. Chamberlain
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in Chamberlain, emphasized the differences between the copyright law, which is a property
rule, and the DMCA, which does not create a new property right but is
rather a liability rule. As a liability rule, the DMCA creates a new cause
of action under which a defendant may be liable.514
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.

Id. at 542.
Id.
Id. at 542-43.
Id. at 543-44.
Lexmark II, 387 F.3d at 543-44.
Id. at 546-50.
Id. at 548-50.
Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1192-93.
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The distinction between a property right and a liability rule also affects the necessary elements for proving a violation of a right or rule. In
order to prove copyright infringement, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant copied elements of the protected work.515 Under the DMCA, a
plaintiff alleging circumvention (or trafficking) must show that the defendant’s access to the protected work was unauthorized.516
With respect to the “unauthorized” access requirements, it is important to note that because the copyright law itself authorizes the public to
make certain uses of copyrighted materials, consumers who purchase a
product containing a copy of embedded software have the inherent legal
right to use that copy of the software. The court, in Chamberlain, therefore held that copyright owners are not entitled to prohibit legitimate
and legal uses, such as fair use, by imposing contractual and technical
limitations on such uses.517
Furthermore, the court discussed the scope of copyright protection
and emphasized that DMCA anti-circumvention provisions do not alter it
in any way. In the words of the court:
The anticircumvention provisions convey no additional property rights
in and of themselves; they simply provide property owners with new
ways to secure their property. Like all property owners taking legitimate steps to protect their property, however, copyright owners relying
on the anticircumvention provisions remain bound by all other relevant
bodies of law. . . What the DMCA did was introduce new grounds for
liability in the context of the unauthorized access of copyrighted
material.518

In addition, the court explicitly rejected the interpretation suggested
by the plaintiff, Chamberlain, to the anti-circumvention provisions. For
this interpretation, it is necessary to distinguish between the right to
access a copyrighted work and the copyright protection itself. Chamberlain’s interpretation understands the DMCA as creating a new protection for copyrighted works, i.e. the protection over the access to the
copyrighted work.
The court emphasized the hazardous implications on competition associated with accepting such interpretation.519 As the court stated,
Chamberlain suggested a reading of the DMCA that “would allow virtually any company to attempt to leverage its sales into aftermarket monopolies—a practice that both the antitrust laws and the doctrine of
copyright misuse normally prohibit.”520 Thus, the court held that the
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.

Id. at 1193 (citing Feist Pub., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)).
Id.
Id. at 1202.
Id. at 1193-94.
Id. at 1200-01.
Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1201 (omitting internal citation).
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DMCA “prohibits only forms of access that bear a reasonable relationship to the protections that the Copyright Act otherwise affords copyright owners.”521
Furthermore, the court held that a violation of Section 1201(a)(2) of
the DMCA consists of the following conditions to be proven by the
plaintiff:
(1) ownership of a valid copyright on a work, (2) effectively controlled by
a technological measure, which has been circumvented, (3) that third
parties can now access (4) without authorization, in a manner that (5)
infringes or facilitates infringing of a right protected by the Copyright
Act, because of a product that (6) the defendant either (i) designed or
produced primarily for circumvention; (ii) made available despite only
limited commercial significance other than circumvention; or (iii) marketed for use in circumvention of the controlling technological
measure.522

The court ruled that Chamberlain did not show the requisite lack of
authorization, and did not prove that there is a nexus between access
and protection. Furthermore, Chamberlain did not explain how the access provided by Skylink’s garage opener facilitated any infringement of
the Copyright Act.523
C. SUMMARY
As is apparent from these two cases, the copyright law can offer several paths for regulating anticompetitive behavior occurring under the
DRM/DMCA regime. Such paths become possible due to the application
of existing and known copyright law doctrines to the circumstances of
the DRM/DMCA regime.
However, there may be possible flaws in regulating anticompetitive
actions that occurred under the DRM/DMCA regime. Such flaws derive
from the tremendous expansion of copyright law in recent years. In the
last decade, intellectual property laws have expanded significantly. Legislation by the U.S. Congress has expanded the scope of copyright and
trademark laws, while court rulings have enlarged the scope of patent
law and legalized right holders’ licensing restrictions, which in practice
strengthen intellectual property rights.524 RealNetworks is an example
of such an expansion of intellectual property rights. In RealNetworks,
the District Court for the Northern District of California interpreted the
DMCA as granting a new right to copyright owners: the right to control
521. Id. at 1202.
522. Id. at 1203.
523. Id. at 1204.
524. See Mark A. Lemley, A New Balance Between IP and Antitrust, 8 SW. J. L. & TRADE
AM. 237 (2007) (citing Walker Process Equip. Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chem. Corp., 382
U.S. 172 (1965)); Abramson, supra note 493, at 436-69.
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any access to their copyrighted work.525
These developments have led to overly strong intellectual property
laws and unnecessarily reduced public welfare. These developments
may also undermine the exact goal of intellectual property laws –encouraging innovation. Excessively strong intellectual property laws may
block or prevent fair access to the building blocks of further innovation
and ultimately may impede future innovation.526
VII. CONCLUSION
The DRM/DMCA regime is here to stay. Indeed, digital music is now
available for download DRM-free in most online music stores.527 The
use of DRM, however, especially the anticompetitive use that occurred
under the DRM/DMCA regime, is not necessarily related to attempts to
block piracy in the music industry.
For example, Apple’s attorney stated that even if Apple is not required by the entertainment industry to employ any type of DRM, it
would still continue to employ its own developed DRM – FairPlay.528 As
he correctly predicted, Apple removed its DRM protection from music
files, but left it on movies and television shows.529 Moreover, Apple still
employs DRM on its iPod and iPhone devices in order to assure these
devices cannot be used with any other software beside iTunes.530 It
seems, therefore, that the use of DRM in coming years may continue,
though not as a tool for blocking piracy, but as a means to control the
secondary market.531
Thus, it is still necessary to address anticompetitive behaviors that
occur under the DRM/DMCA regime and find the most suitable law for
regulating such behaviors in an efficient way. Such regulation must
take into consideration the unique circumstances surrounding any such
behaviors occurring under the DRM/DMCA regime. In other words, the
most suitable regulation has to adequately address the special characteristics of IT markets discussed herein.
525. RealNetworks, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
526. Abramson, supra note 493, at 436-69.
527. See discussion in footnote 442, supra; EMI Group Ltd, EMI Music Launches DRMFree Superior Sound Quality Downloads Across Its Entire Digital Repertoire (Apr. 2, 2007),
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-161385097.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
528. Fred Von Lohmann, FairPlay: Another Anticompetitive Use of DRM, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUNDATION, May 25, 2004, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2004/05/fairplay-another-anticompetitive-use-drm (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
529. Apple Press Release, supra note 15.
530. Jacqui Cheng, A Look at Apple’s Love for DRM and Consumer Lock-ins, ARS
TECHNICA, Jan. 4, 2010, http://arstechnica.com/apple/news/2010/01/a-look-at-apples-lovefor-drm-and-consumer-lock-ins.ars (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
531. ITUNES CASE STUDY, supra note 441, at 40-50.

\\server05\productn\S\SFT\27-1\SFT101.txt

2009]

unknown

Seq: 79

A STRANGER IN THE WIKINOMICS WORLD

24-MAY-10

15:36

79

Antitrust laws and the current tests and standards for enforcing
them do not seem to provide an adequate regulation, given the dynamic
characteristic of competition in IT markets and the significant role of
nonmarket based information production models in IT markets. However, as described in Section IV.E., antitrust law is still called to the rescue whenever there is alleged anticompetitive behavior in IT markets.
Therefore, it is necessary to adapt antitrust law to IT markets.
The copyright law, however, seems to provide a more suitable regulation through existing copyright law doctrines that is aimed at promoting progress. However, as indicated in Section VI.B., the expansion of
the copyright law in the last decade may impose several barriers on the
ability to create novel and innovative goods using existing copyrighted
works.
In conclusion, given the setbacks in the regulation under copyright
law, it seems necessary to conduct further research on the application of
antitrust enforcement standards. Under such research, it would be necessary to examine how antitrust enforcement standards should be
changed in order to adequately address the unique features of IT markets discussed herein.
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